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1Introduction
by  MAT ThEW A.  ROSENSTEIN
October 2007 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the 
initiation of the conflict between India and Pakistan 
over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). This timeframe 
equates roughly to three generations of people living 
under uncertainty in all parts of J&K, and three 
generations of Indians, Pakistanis, and the interna-
tional community failing to reach consensus on how 
to resolve the questions underlying this seemingly 
intractable dispute. Although a “final solution” for 
J&K has consistently remained unattainable during 
this long and sometimes violent period, the argu-
ments and strategies on both sides have not remained 
static, nor have the attitudes and behaviors of the 
people of J&K as they experienced shifts in their 
economic and political surroundings.
Today, there is a peace process in place between 
India and Pakistan. Though this process is compre-
hensive and includes various issues, there has been 
prominent focus on J&K. At the popular level, both 
countries have agreed to open the Line of Control 
(LoC) and allow limited interactions. People of 
divided families living along the LoC, especially in 
the regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, and Muzaf-
farabad, have been allowed to meet each other. 
Politically, both India and Pakistan have proposed 
new ideas, clearly showing a shift from their stated 
positions. Both Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf 
and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have 
underlined the need to make borders (including the 
LoC) soft and even irrelevant. The opening of the 
LoC immediately after the devastating earthquake in 
October 2005 and the two bus services (between Sri-
nagar and Muzaffarabad; and Rawlakot and Poonch) 
are a part of this new process. At the security level, 
both countries have been sincerely pursuing their 
ceasefire and there have been no incidents between 
the two militaries across the LoC since 2004. There 
have been reports at the highest level within India 
regarding reduction in cross-border infiltration. These 
are the achievements so far.
however, this is only a part of the story. At the 
popular level, interactions across the LoC are still 
minimal, and are focused only on the divided families 
in the aforementioned three regions. The other 
regions—Kargil, Leh, Skardu, and Gilgit—are totally 
left out of these popular interactions. There is an 
increasing demand from all regions of J&K to open 
the LoC for trade and commerce. Politically, there 
is an internal peace process between New Delhi and 
various sections in Jammu and Kashmir. however, 
this process is not inclusive, as the separatist and mili-
tant groups fall outside the dialogue. On Pakistan’s 
side, such a process is yet to be undertaken between 
Islamabad and Muzaffarabad. The Northern Areas 
so far have not become a part of any peace process—
internal, bilateral, or cross-LoC. In terms of secu-
rity, despite the decline in cross-border infiltration, 
violence in the Indian part of J&K continues. These 
are the challenges.
The collection of articles contained in this issue 
trace historical developments of various aspects of the 
Kashmir conflict, and present analyses and recom-
mendations regarding what policy approaches might 
emerge from this point. The contributors—from 
India, Pakistan, the United States, and Kashmir 
itself—offer perspectives about the interests of each 
of these stakeholders and the international commu-
nity, including China—another claimant to land in 
J&K. Above all, this issue of Swords and Ploughshares 
examines the many challenges, but also opportuni-
ties, associated with Kashmir, and highlights potential 
avenues for resolving the conflict in the context of 
contemporary Indo-Pak relations and against the 
backdrop of current conditions in J&K.
Suba Chandran’s article reminds us that “the 
Kashmir conflict” can actually refer to two con-
flicts—one focused primarily on the disagreement 
between India and Pakistan, and another centered 
on the relationship of the people and institutions in 
Indian administered regions of J&K to the Indian 
central government. Chandran examines India’s poli-
cies, concluding that New Delhi must include more 
diverse Kashmiri interlocutors in its dialogues, and 
should exercise greater practicality and flexibility in 
its negotiations with Pakistan. Next, Rifaat hussain 
explores the historical evolution of Pakistan’s official 
position with respect to J&K up until the present, 
with particular focus on the perceived shift since 
1999 under Pervez Musharraf. As this issue goes to 
press, Pakistan finds itself at a political crossroads 
domestically. hussain cautiously suggests that 
Pakistan’s new outlook in the Kashmir dispute could 
signal opportunities for future progress, although 
much depends on the how the current uncertain 
political situation will unfold. The next article, by 
Mehraj hajni, provides a Kashmiri scholar’s perspec-
tive. hajni offers insight into militancy and gover-
nance problems in the region. Although grounded 
by its treatment of these challenging trends, hajni’s 
2article lends a note of optimism with his vision for a 
more peaceful and prosperous J&K. 
Ambassador howard Schaffer, who has studied 
and experienced South Asian diplomacy throughout 
his distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service 
and beyond, examines the international community’s 
efforts over time to assist in resolving the Kashmir 
issue. his article provides a balanced discussion of the 
present openings and pitfalls for the United States 
and other actors to facilitate a settlement. Although 
China, another stakeholder in the dispute, has for 
some time now professed neutrality after earlier align-
ment with Pakistan, Jabin Jacob points to Chinese 
strategic and economic interests that would benefit 
from a resolution.
Dipankar Sengupta shows how the Kashmir con-
flict has taken its toll in the form of harsh economic 
realities, especially since the onset of insurgency 
in the 1990s. Sengupta’s findings hold important 
implications regarding participatory economic 
policymaking and entrepreneurship versus top-down 
development packages. Seema Sridhar examines 
the potential economic advantages of enhanced 
cooperation on water management issues in J&K. 
While demonstrating that one can legitimately term 
Kashmir a resource conflict, she shows that the 
restraint and cooperation displayed by India and 
Pakistan over water suggests a basis for confidence-
building already exists.
One acknowledgment is in order. Suba Chandran 
from the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in 
New Delhi played a central role in conceptualizing 
and developing this collection of articles. his com-
munications with several contributors and his edito-
rial skills proved vital. Although any errors associated 
with this issue should rightly be attributed to me, 
tremendous credit is due to Suba, and especially his 
passionate commitment to improving conditions in 
J&K, for this issue seeing the light of day.
Finally, a few words about ACDIS at the Univer-
sity of Illinois. For nearly thirty years, ACDIS has 
made important contributions to dialogue about 
South Asian security issues. In that time, ACDIS has 
produced extensive resources about a wide range of 
problems relevant to South Asian security, including 
numerous scholarly monographs and edited collec-
tions, nearly seventy Occasional Papers and Research 
Reports, and several previous issues of Swords and 
Ploughshares. Many of these materials are available on 
the program’s web site, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu. 
As ACDIS approaches its thirtieth anniversary, the 
program remains committed to the study of South 
Asian security problems, while continuing to foster 
exciting new initiatives in other aspects of interna-
tional security.
3Short Takes
Food will last while the forests last.
—Kashmiri proverb
Today there is talk of war everywhere. Everyone fears a war breaking out between 
the two countries. If that happens, it will be a calamity both for India and for 
Pakistan.
—Mahatma Gandhi, speech about Kashmir at the Prayer Meeting on January 4, 1948
If after a proper plebiscite the people of Kashmir said, “We do not want to be with 
India,” we are committed to accept it even though it might pain us.
—Jawaharlal Nehru, first Prime Minister of India, statement to the Indian Parliament on June 16, 1948
If we want to normalize relations between Pakistan and India and bring harmony 
to the region, the Kashmir dispute will have to be resolved peacefully through a 
dialogue on the basis of the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
—Pervez Musharraf, Prime Minister (1999–2001) and President of Pakistan (2001–present)
No meaningful dialogue can be held with Pakistan until it abandons the use of 
terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy.
—Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India (1996 and 1998–2004)
You are fire / A furious fire of burning youth / Come out / And cross the hills and 
dales / Raise a storm!
—Dina Nath Nadim (1916–1988), Kashmiri poet
4Articles
 The conflict of Kashmir is 
primarily linked to the larger 
Indo-Pak conflict. Its actors 
include India, Pakistan, and 
Kashmiris.
 The conflict in Kashmir 
refers to the relations 
between New Delhi and 
various communities and 
their aspirations in Jammu, 
Kashmir, and Ladakh 
regions.
 Since the 1971 war, 
India’s primary objective in 
the conflict of Kashmir has 
been to maintain the status 
quo and convert the Line of 
Control into an international 
border.
Jammu & Kashmir: India’s 
Objectives and Strategies
by  D.  SUBA ChANDRAN
There are two sets of conflicts relating to Jammu and 
Kashmir—the conflict in Kashmir and the conflict of 
Kashmir. The conflict of Kashmir is primarily linked 
to the larger Indo-Pak conflict and its actors include 
India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris. In the initial decades 
following the 1947 partition, India’s primary objec-
tive in the conflict of Kashmir was to internationalize 
the issue to its advantage, based on its legal claim over 
the entire Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) region includ-
ing the Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Gilgit, and Baltistan 
regions. These four regions, under direct and indirect 
control of Pakistan, are administered through two 
different political entities. The regions of Mirpur and 
Muzaffarabad—called “Azad Kashmir”—have limited 
autonomy, while the Gilgit and Baltistan regions are 
referred as the Northern Areas and fall under the total 
control of Islamabad. 
Withdrawal of Pakistani troops from “Azad 
Kashmir” and the Northern Areas—collectively 
referred to by India as Pakistan occupied Kashmir 
(PoK)—and its reintegration with the rest of J&K 
had been the primary objective of India during the 
initial phase of the conflict. however, this objective 
slowly changed in a shift that became visible during 
and after the 1971 War with Pakistan. A Line of 
Control (LoC) was established after this war, and it 
is widely believed that during negotiations leading to 
the Simla agreement that followed the war, India and 
Pakistan agreed to convert this line into a permanent 
border between the two countries. Ever since, India’s 
primary objective in the conflict of Kashmir has been 
to maintain the status quo and convert the LoC into 
an international border.
The conflict in Kashmir refers to the relations 
between New Delhi and various communities and 
their aspirations in Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh 
regions. Though the high level of violence since the 
1990s has hijacked the issues in J&K, there are other 
serious issues from these three regions. For example, 
people of Ladakh have been demanding a Union Ter-
ritory (UT) status within India, while the people of 
Jammu region have been demanding a separate state, 
again within India. A major section within Kashmir 
Valley demands complete independence from India, 
while another section demands more autonomy 
in terms of federal-provincial relations. Political 
manipulation, bad governance and corruption have 
been major issues for all three regions.
India’s policy towards the conflict in Kashmir has 
been narrowly focused in terms of addressing the 
political issues of Kashmir Valley, winning the Kash-
miris politically and psychologically, and integrat-
ing them emotionally into the Indian mainstream. 
Until recently, the other two regions—Jammu and 
Ladakh—have been totally neglected by New Delhi.
India’s Kashmir Policies and Strategies
What are the major issues in India’s policies and 
strategies vis-à-vis the conflict in Kashmir and the 
conflict of Kashmir? Though India’s policies towards 
both these conflicts have been criticized as ad hoc 
and reactive, in retrospect it appears New Delhi has 
been clear on what it wants regarding both conflicts. 
Externally with Pakistan, New Delhi wants to convert 
the LoC into an international border and make the 
status quo permanent. Internally, it wants to keep the 
demands for independence under control, aiming to 
win the Kashmiris psychologically and emotionally 
by integrating the political elite into the mainstream. 
The strategies that New Delhi has adopted to secure 
these policies may have different guises, but the 
policies on these two broader issues have remained 
constant. These policies and the strategies adopted to 
secure them require a critique before commenting on 
the contemporary situation and making conclusions 
about the road ahead. 
The Prism of Terrorism • Until recently, India 
perceived both the conflict in and conflict of J&K 
mainly through the prism of terrorism. Internally, 
the absence of militant attacks is seen as the presence 
of peace and political stability in Kashmir. Problems 
of governance are seen as an offshoot of militancy; 
hence, the government has believed that once the 
latter is brought under control, there would be 
better governance. Issues such as corruption and bad 
governance are carpeted under militancy. Counterin-
surgency operations have assumed more significance, 
without understanding that militancy has been the 
product of certain political questions and that once 
these political questions are addressed, the mili-
tancy would automatically die down. These political 
5questions raised by the Kashmiris may be real or 
imaginary or both; but it is the duty of the govern-
ment to address them politically.
Externally, cross-border terrorism was perceived 
as the main bilateral issue vis-à-vis Pakistan. India 
has long avoided discussing J&K with Pakistan and 
repeatedly emphasized that until the latter stops 
cross-border terrorism, there could not be any mean-
ingful negotiation. Internationally, while Pakistan 
attempted to highlight the issue of “human rights” 
and “political oppression” in Kashmir by New Delhi, 
India attempted to flag cross-border terrorism as the 
main issue and hurdle in taking any further measures. 
As cross-border terrorism became the highlight 
of India’s approach towards the conflict of Kashmir, 
two issues became prominent in the 1990s and in the 
early years of this decade. Any dialogue on demili-
tarization or troop relocation in J&K became a non-
negotiable issue for New Delhi, as it was linked to 
cross-border terrorism. New Delhi repeatedly empha-
sized that unless cross-border terrorism is stopped, 
there cannot be discussion on troop withdrawal, as 
the latter is a response to the former. 
As part of a unilateral measure to address cross-
border terrorism, New Delhi decided to fence the 
Line of Control. The international border between 
the two countries has already been fenced and 
regularly patrolled by the paramilitary forces on both 
sides. The LoC until the mid-1990s was never fenced. 
Pakistan has always been opposed to the idea of India 
fencing the LoC, as it felt fencing would give an 
element of permanency to the LoC. As a part of not 
allowing the fencing, Pakistan resorted to continuous 
shelling whenever India undertook any efforts on the 
same. With a ceasefire in place since the end of 2003, 
India went ahead and completed fencing the LoC. 
Efforts are in progress to install advanced sensors and 
related equipments to electronically monitor this 
fencing.
India’s Narrow Focus • The “political” approach 
vis-à-vis the conflicts in and of Kashmir that New 
Delhi has pursued has, until recently, always been 
narrowly focused. Within India, successive govern-
ments in New Delhi have carried out a strategy 
based on organizing periodic elections for the state 
legislative assembly of Jammu and Kashmir and 
sustaining an elected government at the state level. 
Elections, whether rigged or free, are seen as an 
“end” in J&K; the party or coalition that forms the 
government subsequently in Srinagar is expected to 
adhere to the existing provisions and maintain the 
status quo, without any demands on changing the 
nature of union-state relations. In the late 1990s, the 
Union government relied completely on the National 
Conference (NC) government led by Farooq Abdul-
lah, and now seems to be continuing the same with 
the Congress-Peoples Democratic Party coalition 
government.
Once the state government is in place in Srinagar, 
the Union government’s approach towards Kashmir 
is limited only to the former, irrespective of its popu-
larity. Until recently, any further political engage-
ments outside this sphere have been ad hoc and were 
without any focus; the Union government failed to 
initiate any substantial dialogue with those sections 
that fall outside the mainstream political parties, 
especially the separatists led by two factions of the 
All Parties hurriyat Conference (APhC) and other 
independent leaders. 
Only recently did the Union government initiate 
efforts to address all of the groups concerned. Two 
Round Table Conferences (RTCs) have been orga-
nized since 2006, and five working groups have been 
formed on different issues, which include the follow-
ing: New Delhi’s relations with the State, increasing 
relations across the Line of Control (LoC), boosting 
the State’s economic development, rehabilitating the 
victims of violence, and ensuring good governance. 
These Working Groups have submitted their reports 
and New Delhi is yet to initiate follow up actions on 
these recommendations.
Vis-à-vis Pakistan, India has long refused to initi-
ate a meaningful dialogue on Kashmir. As mentioned 
above, cross-border terrorism became a major issue in 
the conflict of Kashmir with Pakistan. however, since 
the end of the 1990s, for the first time India had 
agreed to include J&K as a part of various other bilat-
eral negotiations including those over Siachen, Tulbul 
Navigation/Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, elimination 
of terrorism and illicit narcotics, economic and com-
mercial cooperation, and exchange of friendly visits. 
Since 2004, two slogans have become the 
catchwords of India’s approach towards Pakistan 
on Kashmir—“soft borders” and “making borders 
irrelevant.” Atal Behari Vajpayee, the previous Prime 
Minister, took bold measures in addressing the con-
flict of Kashmir. Efforts were made to make borders 
“soft” in terms of breaching it legally through more 
crossing points and a liberalized visa regime. These 
efforts witnessed the introduction of the first bus 
service between the two countries from New Delhi 
to Lahore, and talks being initiated on opening the 
international border in other areas. As a result, today 
there is a new rail link between Sindh in Pakistan and 
Rajasthan in India and another bus service between 
Amritsar and Nankana Sahib across the international 
border. Although both these connections became 
functional under the Congress government, efforts 
were taken under Vajpayee’s administration to make 
borders soft.
Manmohan Singh, the current Prime Minis-
ter, came out with a new slogan—making borders 
irrelevant. This caught people’s imagination especially 
 India has aimed to win the 
Kashmiris psychologically 
and emotionally by integrat-
ing the political elite into the 
mainstream.
 As part of a unilateral 
measure to address cross-
border terrorism, New Delhi 
decided to fence the Line of 
Control.
 Only recently did the 
Indian government initiate 
substantial dialogue with 
political parties that fall 
outside the mainstream in 
Jammu and Kashmir.
6after the devastating earthquake in October 2005. 
A few months before the earthquake, a bus service 
was introduced between the two Kashmirs—between 
Muzaffarabad and Srinagar—marking the first time 
such travel was possible in six decades. The opening 
of the LoC in the Jammu region followed this step; 
today there is another bus service between Poonch 
and Rawlakot. 
Resolving the Conflicts: Challenges Ahead
Undoubtedly, in recent years India has taken signifi-
cant measures to address both the conflicts in and 
of Kashmir. Further progress would depend on the 
following. First, in the past and even today, there 
has been no consensus at the national level on what 
could be India’s game plan in Jammu and Kashmir 
and how far it could go in terms of a final resolution. 
The existing Parliamentary Resolution signifies India’s 
maximalist position and not what is feasible and 
practical. The Union government has been reluctant 
to create such a consensus both inside and outside 
the Parliament. There is a clear difference between the 
secular moderates and the extremist hindu Right in 
India. For a final resolution, a national consensus is 
essential inside India. 
The same is also true inside Pakistan. There is no 
consensus inside Pakistan on what could be the final 
settlement of Kashmir. Though Pakistan has been 
insisting on the rhetoric of “what is acceptable to the 
people of Kashmir,” in reality, both the State and its 
people will be unwilling to let go of territory under 
its control. While it would be agreeable to Pakistan 
to continue with the present set up in Muzaffarabad, 
it would be unacceptable to change the status quo, 
especially of the Northern Areas. The recent package 
announced by General Musharraf in October 2007 
on the Northern Areas is cosmetic and a part of 
Islamabad’s larger plan to keep this region under its 
perpetual control. The Northern Areas are strategi-
cally important to Pakistan today for various reasons. 
Among them, the Karakoram highway (KKh) and 
the water resources of the region are significant. With 
Pakistan having plans to expand the KKh and con-
struct a road-rail-gas pipeline link from Gwadar port 
in Balochistan to Kashgar in China, this region is of 
enormous importance.
Second, clearly whether it is making borders 
soft or irrelevant, India’s strategies are aimed at not 
redrawing the existing boundaries, whereas Pakistan’s 
efforts for six decades have been aimed at altering the 
status quo. Much would depend on how successfully 
India can be in convincing Pakistan on this issue.
Third, relating to the conflict in Kashmir, as 
mentioned above, New Delhi has taken significant 
measures. however, two important steps are not 
being addressed convincingly so far. One, the dia-
logue inside India, between New Delhi and various 
groups of Kashmir, even today remains unconvinc-
ing. The separatist groups, led by the two factions 
of the hurriyat Conference, are yet to be taken into 
confidence. For various political reasons, both fac-
tions of the hurriyat Conference have so far refused 
to enter into any meaningful dialogue with New 
Delhi. True, the hurriyat certainly cannot be consid-
ered as the sole voice of the Kashmiris, for its support 
base is narrowly based inside Kashmir Valley and has 
no representation in the Jammu and Ladakh regions. 
however, undoubtedly, it does represent a segment of 
opinion inside Kashmir Valley. 
Besides the separatists, the Union government has 
also not been able to initiate any dialogue with the 
militant groups. Today, the non-State armed groups 
fighting in Kashmir can be clearly divided into two 
groups. The first one, led by the hizbul Mujahideen, 
has ambitions that are more political and limited 
to Kashmir. Cadres of hizbul are primarily Kash-
miris and have been fighting for a political cause. 
The second group is led by the Lashkar-e-Toiba 
and Jaish-e-Mohammad, with both political and 
religious ambitions aimed at a larger cause—beyond 
Kashmir—of destroying India. Cadres of Jaish and 
Lashkar are primarily drawn from Pakistan. The 
Indian security and intelligence forces have been suc-
cessful in forcing the cadres of hizbul to surrender or 
eliminating them considerably, thus weakening their 
base. however, Lashkar and Jaish have been fighting 
a bloody battle against the Indian security forces. 
Besides, the control of Pakistan’s security forces over 
Jaish and Lashkar in recent years has been questioned 
seriously. The important question that needs to be 
addressed here is: what if a compromise acceptable 
to India, Pakistan, and a section of Kashmiris is not 
acceptable to these jihadi forces?
Finally, India has to take proactive and if needed 
even unilateral measures in increasing the cross-
LoC interactions. In September 2007, both India 
and Pakistan agreed in principle to trade across the 
Line of Control. Ever since the LoC opened for the 
bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar in 
2005, people living in all five parts of J&K—Jammu, 
Muzaffarabad, Northern Areas, Kashmir Valley and 
Ladakh—have been demanding the opening of the 
LoC for economic and cultural interactions. While 
the Chambers of Commerce and Industries, both 
in Jammu and Srinagar, have pressured New Delhi 
to open the LoC for trade, people in the these five 
regions have been putting pressure on both govern-
ments to open more routes and allow more people 
to cross the LoC. The apple and carpet industries in 
Kashmir Valley in particular have been demanding 
the opening of the LoC for trade. Today, Kashmiri 
apples go from the valley by truck via Jammu to 
Delhi and then beyond. If the LoC is opened for 
goods, the apples from Anantnag and Sopore could 
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and “making borders 
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7reach Rawalpindi via Muzaffarabad faster than they 
could reach New Delhi. 
So far the cross-LoC interactions have been nar-
rowly based in addressing the interests of only one 
region—the Kashmir Valley. The regions of Jammu 
and Ladakh have been largely ignored. There are 
numerous divided families in the Kargil region, who 
have relatives across the LoC in Skardu and Gilgit 
and also in the Jammu region. India should take 
active measures to open Kargil-Skardu and Jammu-
Sialkot roads for the movement of divided families. 
There is a need to expand the interactions along the 
LoC and this enlargement should address all five 
regions—Jammu, Muzaffarabad, Kashmir Valley, 
Northern Areas and Ladakh.
Suba Chandran is Assistant Director of the Institute 
of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi. He holds 
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Historically, Pakistan has viewed its dispute with 
India over Kashmir as the key determinant of its stra-
tegic behavior in the international arena. Advocacy of 
the rights of the Kashmiri people to freely determine 
their future has been the main plank of Islamabad’s 
diplomatic strategy in the United Nations and other 
international fora. By championing the cause of the 
rights of the Kashmiri people, Islamabad has tried to 
remind the world that India’s control over two-thirds 
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is not only legally 
untenable but morally unjust, as it was achieved 
through an instrument of accession with a ruler who 
had lost the support of the vast majority of his pre-
dominantly Muslim subjects. Pakistan’s official stance 
on Kashmir can be summarized into the following six 
interrelated propositions:
1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed 
territory.
2. This disputed status is acknowledged in the UN 
Security Council resolutions of August 13, 1948 
and January 5, 1949, to which both Pakistan and 
India are a party.
3. These resolutions remain operative and cannot be 
unilaterally disregarded by either party.
4. Talks between India and Pakistan over the future 
status of Jammu and Kashmir should aim to 
secure the right of self-determination for the 
Kashmiri people. This right entails a free, fair and 
internationally supervised plebiscite as agreed in 
the UN Security Council resolutions.
5. The plebiscite should offer the people of Jammu 
and Kashmir the choice of permanent accession to 
either Pakistan or India.
6. Talks between India and Pakistan, in regard to the 
future status of Jammu and Kashmir, should be 
held in conformity both with the Simla Agree-
ment of July 1972 and the relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions. An international mediatory 
role in such talks may be appropriate if mutually 
agreed.
This stated Pakistani position on Kashmir has 
undergone a fundamental shift under President 
General Pervez Musharraf who, after assuming power 
in October 1999 in a bloodless coup, has been, in his 
own words, “pondering outside the box” solutions 
to resolve the dispute. This paper examines various 
aspects of the changing Pakistani outlook on Kashmir 
and analyzes different factors underpinning this 
change. 
Pakistan’s Changing Outlook 
on Kashmir
by  SyED RIFAAT hUSSAIN
8Pakistan’s “New Thinking on Kashmir”
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has alternated between 
force and diplomacy, with the former remaining the 
dominant instrument until very recently. having 
unsuccessfully tried wars in 1947-1948 and 1965, 
different forms of sub-conventional warfare in the 
1980s and the 1990s, and limited war in Kargil in 
1999 as instruments of its Kashmir policy to change 
the territorial status quo in its favor, Islamabad 
revived its quest for a diplomatic solution under Pres-
ident Musharraf. In summer 2001, two years after 
the Kargil conflict, which nearly provoked a full-scale 
India-Pakistan war, President Musharraf proposed a 
“reciprocal action plan” to New Delhi as a first step to 
defuse tensions between them and to promote peace. 
While calling upon India to stop atrocities in Indian-
held Kashmir, it said “Pakistan might recommend 
to the freedom fighters to moderate their indigenous 
freedom struggle in Kashmir.” 
During his summit meeting with Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Agra on July 14–16, 
2001, President Musharraf reassured his Indian host 
that he had come to meet him “with an open mind.” 
he also underscored his desire to have “discussions 
with Indian leaders on establishing tension free and 
cooperative relations between our two countries.” 
The Agra Summit failed to produce a tangible 
outcome, but the draft Agra Declaration that both 
sides considered issuing at the end of their historic 
meeting clearly stated that “settlement of the Jammu 
and Kashmir issue would pave the way for nor-
malization of relations between the two countries.” 
President Musharraf outlined his four-point approach 
to resolving the Kashmir dispute during his breakfast 
meeting with representatives of electronic and print 
media held in Agra on July 16, 2001. Responding 
to a question on how best to resolve the Kashmir 
dispute, President Musharraf said: “Step one was the 
initiation of dialogue…acceptance of Kashmir as the 
main issue was step two…negating certain solutions 
unacceptable to both sides was step three…exploring 
remaining options was step four.” 
In a remarkable reversal of Islamabad’s verbal 
strategy on Kashmir, President Musharraf publicly 
stated on December 17, 2003 that even though “we 
are for United Nations Security resolutions … now 
we have left that aside.” A month later, in a joint 
statement issued in Islamabad, following his meeting 
with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee on January 6, 
2004, Musharraf categorically pledged that he would 
not “permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to 
be used to support terrorism in any manner.” This 
statement was meant to mollify New Delhi’s concerns 
relating to the issue of alleged “cross-border” infiltra-
tion from Pakistan.
By dropping the longstanding demand for a 
UN-mandated plebiscite over divided Kashmir, and 
by assuring New Delhi that Islamabad would not 
encourage violent activity in Indian-held Kashmir, 
President Musharraf tried to create much-needed 
political space for New Delhi to substantively engage 
itself with Islamabad for finding a workable solution 
to the festering Kashmir dispute.
President Musharraf reiterated his four-point pro-
posal for resolving the Kashmir dispute while address-
ing a closed door symposium organized by the India 
Today Conclave 2004 via satellite from Islamabad on 
March 13, 2004. According to him: 
1.  The centrality of the Kashmir dispute should be 
accepted by India and Pakistan. 
2.  Talks should commence to resolve the dispute. 
3.  All solutions not acceptable to any of the three 
parties are to be taken off the table. 
4.  The most feasible and acceptable option should be 
chosen.
A few months later, while talking to a group of 
newspaper editors at an Iftar dinner in Islamabad on 
October 25, 2004, President Musharraf called for 
a national debate on new options for the Kashmir 
dispute. The necessity for this debate stemmed from 
the fact that demands for conversion of the Line of 
Control (LoC) into an international border and a 
plebiscite were not acceptable to Pakistan and India 
respectively. To break the deadlock he suggested 
that identification of various zones of the disputed 
territory needs to be carried out followed by their 
demilitarization and a determination of their status. 
he identified seven regions in Jammu and Kashmir 
based on “religious, ethnic and geographical terms” 
for this purpose. 
Two regions—Azad Kashmir and Northern 
areas—are under the control of Pakistan, whereas 
five regions are under Indian control. The first part 
comprises Jammu, Sambha and Katwa where hindus 
are in majority. The second part also comprises 
Jammu but the areas include Dodha, Phirkuch and 
Rajawri where a Muslim population is in majority, 
which includes Gujars, Sudhans and Rajas who are 
also associated with Azad Kashmir. The third part is 
the area of Kashmir Valley, which also has Muslim 
majority. The fourth part is Kargil, which has Shia 
and Balti populations in majority, and the fifth area 
is Ladakh and adjoining areas where Buddhists live. 
President Musharraf further said that it was impera-
tive that the linguistic, ethnic, religious, geographic, 
political and other aspects of these seven regions 
should be reviewed and a peaceful solution to the 
problem found.
Speaking at a conference organized by Pugwash 
in March 2006, President Musharraf renewed his call 
for demilitarization, asserting 
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and self-governance offered a practical solution 
to the Kashmir dispute. An ultimate solution 
to the problem on these lines would make the 
LoC irrelevant. And such a solution would 
neither require redrawing of borders, nor make 
Line of Control irrelevant. The demilitarisa-
tion would be a great confidence-building 
measure and provide relief to Kashmir. This 
will also help discourage militancy.
In an interview given to CNN-IBN news channel 
in January 2007, President Musharraf proposed joint 
management by India and Pakistan of the disputed 
region of Jammu and Kashmir. That arrange-
ment would leave India and Pakistan with reduced 
sovereignty over the territories, which they presently 
control in Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf further 
said in that interview that 
[he did] not agree with India’s claim that 
there already was self-governance in the held 
Kashmir, and claimed that most of the people 
there do not accept the Indian government. If 
India believed there was self-governance, we 
keep sticking to this position, we will never 
move forward because we do not agree. There-
fore, if you want to move forward, we have to 
leave stated position.
In his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, Presi-
dent Musharraf described his four-point proposal 
as “purely personal which needed to be sold to the 
public by all involved parties for acceptance.”
he summarized his proposal as follows:
1.  First, identify the geographic regions of Kashmir 
that need resolution. At present the Pakistani 
part is divided into two regions: Northern areas 
and Azad Kashmir. The Indian part is divided 
into three regions: Jammu, Srinagar, and Ladakh. 
Are all these on the table for discussion, or there 
are ethnic, political, and strategic considerations 
dictating some give and take.
2. Second, demilitarize the identified region or 
regions and curb all militant aspects of the 
struggle for freedom. This will give comfort to the 
Kashmiris, who are fed up with the fighting and 
killing on both sides.
3. Third, introduce self-governance or self-rule in 
the identified region or regions. Let the Kashmiris 
have the satisfaction of running their own affairs 
without having an international character and 
remaining short of independence.
4. Fourth, and most important, have a joint manage-
ment mechanism with a membership consisting 
of Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris oversee-
ing self-governance and dealing with residual 
subjects common to all identified regions and 
those subjects that are beyond the scope of self-
governance. 
Factors Driving Pakistan’s New 
Thinking on Kashmir
There are a number of factors driving Islamabad’s 
new thinking on Kashmir. First, there is a clear 
recognition of the inefficacy of war in the wake of 
Pakistan’s overt nuclearization in 1998 to resolve 
the central issue of Kashmir. In early 1999, troops 
of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry, disguised as 
Kashmiri mujahideen, crossed the LoC and occupied 
strategic mountain peaks in Mushkoh Valley, Dras, 
Kargil, and Batalik sectors of Ladakh. Through this 
military incursion Islamabad sought to “block the 
Dras-Kargil highway, cut off Leh from Srinagar, trap 
the Indian forces on the Siachin glacier, raise the 
militant’s banner of revolt in the Valley and bring 
the Kashmir issue firmly back to the forefront of the 
international agenda.” Angered by Pakistan’s military 
incursion, which endangered its vital supply routes to 
Leh and the Siachen, New Delhi launched a counter 
military offensive and threatened to impose a war on 
Pakistan in order to restore the status quo. 
India also effectively mobilized world opinion 
against Pakistan. The G-8 countries held Pakistan 
responsible for the military confrontation in Kashmir 
and described the Pakistani military action to change 
the status quo as “irresponsible.” They called upon 
Islamabad to withdraw its forces north of the LoC. 
The EU publicly called for “immediate withdrawal of 
the infiltrators.” The United States also depicted Paki-
stan as the “instigator” and insisted that the status 
quo ante be unconditionally and unambiguously 
restored. Caving in to mounting international pres-
sure for withdrawal, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif made a dash to Washington on July 4, 1999 
and signed a joint statement with President Clinton, 
which called for the restoration of the “sanctity” of 
the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla 
Agreement. The Kargil War exposed the inherent 
limitations of Islamabad’s strategy of sub-conven-
tional war against India in a nuclear environment and 
forced Pakistan into negotiations to resolve the core 
issue of Kashmir. Islamabad realized that war scares 
were neither good for its image as a nuclear weapon 
state nor for its economic development and progress. 
Second, there has been sustained American pres-
sure on Islamabad to bury the hatchet with India 
over Kashmir. The Kargil War and the 2001-2002 
India-Pakistan military stand-off made Washington 
realize that without enduring peace, South Asia 
would remain a nuclear flashpoint and therefore, to 
use President Clinton’s phrase, “the most dangerous 
place on earth.” More importantly, the American 
strategic goal of peace and stability in Afghanistan 
cannot be achieved without moderating India-
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Pakistan competition over Afghanistan. Renewal 
of the India-Pakistan rivalry for influence over 
Afghanistan was deemed bad news for peace in that 
war torn country. Islamabad feels hemmed in by the 
growing Indian diplomatic and economic presence 
in its strategic rear and therefore extremely reluctant 
to let the pro-Indian, Tajik-dominated dispensation 
in Kabul gain ground. Longstanding proposals for 
building trans-Asian gas pipelines would become 
feasible only through India-Pakistan cooperation in 
Afghanistan and also would allow trade to replace 
war as the primary interaction between Afghanistan 
and its neighbors.
The third factor pushing Pakistan toward peace 
with India is the need to display responsible nuclear 
custodianship. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, 
which was waged to remove a “rogue” regime with 
potential for having weapons of mass destruction, 
Islamabad feels obligated to reassure the world 
community about its nuclear weapons and growing 
missile capabilities. Resumption of the India-Pakistan 
dialogue with its focus on nuclear risk reduction 
measures seems to be the only credible way of easing 
world concern over the safety and security of the 
Pakistani nuclear arsenal, which—after the A.Q. 
Khan episode—are being viewed by the international 
community with a great deal of apprehension.
The fourth factor underpinning Islamabad’s new 
approach to Kashmir is the “boomerang” effect 
of jihad as an instrument of Pakistan’s Kashmir 
policy. Emboldened by its pivotal role in the Afghan 
resistance movement that culminated in Moscow’s 
military defeat in 1988, Pakistan turned its attention 
toward Indian-held Kashmir where a Kashmiri “inti-
fada” broke out in 1988-89 against Indian repressive 
policies. Backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intel-
ligence (ISI), several jihadi groups prominent among 
which were the hizbul Mujahideen, the Al Badr 
Mujahideen, the harkat-ul Mujahideen (previously 
known as harkat ul Ansar), the Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, 
and Jaish-e-Mohammed “found a new cause in 
Indian administered Kashmir where an insurgency 
had erupted in 1989.” Their involvement in the 
Kashmiri intifada transformed it from a domestic 
insurgency (conducted via the Jammu Kashmir Lib-
eration Front) into a low-intensity conflict between 
India and Pakistan. As Islamabad’s forward policy 
in Indian-held Kashmir began to take its toll on the 
Indian security forces and along with them those of 
the innocent civilians, New Delhi accused Pakistan of 
waging a proxy war against India from Azad Kashmir. 
Indian and foreign media reports identified at least 
91 insurgent training camps in Azad Kashmir, “the 
bulk of which lie contiguous to the Indian districts of 
Kupwara, Baramullah, Poonch, Rajuari and Jammu.” 
The jihad strategy became an untenable proposi-
tion for Islamabad after the terrorist strikes against 
the United States on September 11, 2001, followed 
by suicide attacks against the Jammu and Kashmir 
state assembly in October and the Indian parlia-
ment in December 2001. These cataclysmic events 
changed the rules of the game and led to the blurring 
of the moral distinction between freedom fight-
ers and terrorists. Under the new rules for a state’s 
responsibility for terrorist groups operating inside 
its borders, Pakistan could no longer allow jihadi 
groups to use its territory with impunity, nor could 
it completely absolve itself of the responsibility 
for the violence perpetrated by them beyond its 
borders. Between December 2001 and July 2002, 
India threatened to wage a limited conventional war 
against Pakistan unless Islamabad terminated its 
support for what New Delhi portrayed as cross-
border terrorism. Leveraging effectively its threat of 
war against Pakistan, New Delhi forced Islamabad to 
crack down on some of the fundamentalist Islamic 
groups waging war against the Indian government in 
Kashmir. Pakistan banned some of the jihadi groups 
in January 2002 and promised to permanently end 
its support for armed militancy in Kashmir provided 
New Delhi agreed to find a negotiated settlement 
of the Kashmir dispute. These moves by Pakistan’s 
government caused huge disappointment among the 
Kashmir militant groups and some radical elements 
associated with them were recruited by Al-Qaeda to 
assassinate President Musharraf in December 2003. 
With Pakistan’s pro-jihad Kashmir policy turned on 
its head, armed militant groups turned their guns and 
anger against the Musharraf regime. They assumed 
the role of “peace spoilers” by joining hands with 
the resurgent Taliban-Al-Qaeda forces operating out 
of the “lawless” borderlands along the Durand line 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
To stem the rising tide of extremist violence in 
the country, in which at least 1,896 people including 
655 civilians, 354 security forces personnel and 887 
terrorists died in 2007 alone, Islamabad intensified 
military operations against the jihadi elements in the 
tribal areas and stormed the radical Lal Masjid (Red 
Mosque) in the capital city of Islamabad in June 2007 
on the suspicion that suicide bombers linked to Al-
Qaeda had taken refuge in the mosque. More than 70 
militants died in the assault on the Red Mosque. To 
avenge the military assault on the Red Mosque and to 
protest the intensified military operations against pro-
Taliban forces in North Waziristan, armed militants 
scrapped a peace deal with the government in July 
2007. In August they captured 280 soldiers including 
a colonel and nine officers after intercepting a mili-
tary convoy in South Waziristan. In October 2007, 
armed militants ambushed an army convoy in North 
Waziristan in which 20 soldiers and 45 militants were 
killed. Over 20 soldiers of the Frontier Corps were 
captured by local Taliban militants on October 7 
after they successfully assaulted a military checkpoint 
in Spin Wam, adjacent to hangu district in troubled 
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North Waziristan. Reacting to these developments, 
President Musharraf told Dawn News TV that the 
prevailing conditions in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) were “extremely precarious” and 
described the threat from religious extremism as the 
primary security challenge facing the country.
Pakistan’s domestic politics took yet another 
violent turn on October 16, 2007 when over 136 
people died and 500 were injured in Karachi, in a 
suicide bombing attack on the homecoming public 
procession of former Prime Minister Benazir’s 
Bhutto’s return to Pakistan. Militant elements linked 
to pro-Taliban warlord Baitullah Mehsud were widely 
believed to be behind this atrocity. In his condolence 
call to Benazir, President Musharraf expressed his 
deepest sorrow over the terrorist attack and vowed to 
arrest the culprits. This rising tide of terrorist violence 
within Pakistan has forced Islamabad to rethink 
its relationship with militant religious groups. The 
Kashmir jihad is now being viewed as a double-edged 
sword with Islamabad holding the sharper end of it 
due to its devastating “blowback” effect.
Domestic Reactions to Pakistan’s 
Shifting Kashmir Policy
President Musharraf ’s new thinking on Kashmir has 
evoked a mixed reaction at home. The religious right, 
led by Jamaat-e-Islami, has vociferously opposed his 
decision to ban the jihadi outfits and questioned 
the wisdom of his moves to seek a settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute outside the framework of the UN 
Security Council resolutions. Islamists have debunked 
the ongoing peace process as a “one man show” and 
have rejected Musharraf ’s proposals as a “U-turn,” 
and a “roll-back” of Pakistan’s principled position 
on Kashmir. They have decried summit meetings 
between President Musharraf and Indian leaders as 
a “national humiliation.” Supporters of the Pakistan 
Muslim League (Nawaz Group) have also accused 
President Musharraf of taking a U-turn on the 
Kashmir issue and neglecting the people of Kashmir 
in his efforts to normalize relations with India. 
The Pakistan People’s Party formerly led by the late 
Benazir Bhutto, while supporting President Mushar-
raf ’s efforts to seek a rapprochement with India, had 
demanded greater transparency about discussions 
being conducted through the back-channel links 
between Islamabad and New Delhi. Significantly, on 
the eve of her return to Pakistan after eight years of 
self-imposed exile abroad, Bhutto publicly stated that 
if voted into power in the January 2008 elections, 
her party would continue the dialogue process with 
India. Prominent Azad Kashmiri leaders includ-
ing former President and Prime Minister of Azad 
Kashmir, Sardar Abdul Qayyum, have also endorsed 
President Musharraf ’s general stance that there is no 
scope for militancy in their freedom struggle and a 
solution is only possible through negotiations and 
peaceful means.
It is worth noting here that the India-Pakistan 
peace process, contrary to prevalent public per-
ceptions of slow progress, seems to have made 
considerable progress in back-channel discussions 
between Islamabad and New Delhi. This progress 
led Pakistan’s foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmood 
Kasuri, to claim in April 2007 that both countries 
were extremely close to reaching a settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute. Media reports indicated that both 
sides had reached a broad agreement on five elements 
of this settlement. The agreed points are: 
1. No change in the territorial layout of Kashmir 
currently divided into Pakistani and Indian areas; 
2. Creation of a soft border across the LoC; 
3. Greater autonomy and self-governance within 
Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of the state; 
4. A cross-LoC consultative mechanism; and finally,
5. Demilitarization of Kashmir at a pace determined 
by the decline in cross border terrorism. 
how this emerging consensus will get sold by 
Islamabad and New Delhi to their respective wary 
publics, determined peace spoilers, and vested 
interests associated with entrenched positions would 
largely depend on the vagaries of domestic politics 
in each country, which at the time of this writing is 
looking increasingly uncertain and fluid.
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Kashmir is the most thorny and intractable issue 
between India and Pakistan. After the eruption of 
violence in the early 1990s, the conflict assumed 
alarming proportions. It worsened Indo-Pak rela-
tions and brought the two countries to the brink of 
a nuclear catastrophe. Precisely for this reason, the 
international community included Kashmir among 
the major trouble spots of the world and advised 
both India and Pakistan to exercise utmost restraint 
and start negotiations towards its resolution. A short 
historical analysis is essential, from a Kashmiri per-
spective, to understand the emergence of the Kashmir 
problem in its various dimensions.
Origins of the Kashmir Conflict
In 1947, before British India was partitioned, there 
were around 600 princely states. Lord Mountbat-
ten, the last Viceroy, advised the rulers of these states 
to accede to either India or Pakistan. Regarding the 
criteria for deciding which of the two dominions a 
state should join, Lord Mountbatten said, “Normally 
geographical situation and communal interests and so 
forth will be factors to be considered.” These princely 
states acceded to either of the two dominions on 
these principles. Although the rulers of Junagarh, 
hyderabad, and Jodhpur wished to accede to Paki-
stan, they were rejected by India on the grounds that 
they were contravening the partition plan because the 
majority of the populations in these princely states 
were hindus. The problem over Kashmir arose as 
“India laid claim to every hindu majority area, on 
similar grounds Pakistan laid claim over the Muslim 
majority state of Kashmir, but such claim was always 
rejected by India.” Thus a dispute over the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir occurred and both the parties 
resorted to different methods and even fought wars to 
acquire this disputed state. 
The tribal invasion in 1947, the “accession of 
Kashmir” to India, and the Indo-Pak war in the same 
year changed the entire map of Jammu and Kashmir 
and divided it into two parts—Indian administered 
Kashmir and Pakistan administered Kashmir. The 
“accession” of the state to the Union of India signed 
by the then ruler Maharaja hari Singh did not mark 
the end of dispute over Kashmir for two reasons. 
First, the accession was made subject to the condi-
tion of the will of people to be ascertained after the 
restoration of normalcy in the state. Second, the issue 
became internationalized, as it was referred to the 
United Nations by the government of India. Besides, 
in both the Tashkent and Simla agreements following 
the wars of 1965 and 1971 respectively, it was agreed 
that the Kashmir issue constitutes a dispute that 
needs to be resolved through bilateral negotiations. 
Since then, developments within and outside 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir had tremendous 
impacts on the psyche of the Kashmiri Muslims and 
resulted in their complete alienation from the rest of 
India. The installation of repressive regimes by the 
Union Government in New Delhi through unpopu-
lar and undemocratic methods, erosion of autonomy 
granted under article 370 of the Indian constitution, 
the systematic encouragement of corruption and 
nepotism, non-development of the state, problems 
of poverty and unemployment, impact of communal 
violence both within and outside the state, oppor-
tunistic alliances and accords between the National 
Conference (NC) and Congress Party, and electoral 
malpractices greatly influenced the young Kashmiri 
Muslims. Outside India, developments in Afghani-
stan, the Iranian revolution, the situation in Eastern 
Europe, and the break up of the Soviet Union also 
contributed in influencing Kashmiri youths towards 
looking for an alternative road.
The Roots and Growth of Militancy 
Many youths in the late 1980s concluded that salva-
tion lay in secession from India, which could be 
achieved only through an armed struggle. Meanwhile, 
Pakistan had been eagerly looking for an opportunity 
to exercise its influence over Kashmir and was also 
keenly waiting to avenge the humiliation inflicted 
upon it by India during the 1971 war. The growing 
situation in Kashmir Valley suited Pakistan, which 
started providing arms and ammunition to the angry 
young Kashmiri Muslims. As a result, an armed 
movement was established which received massive 
support in Muslim dominated areas of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Apart from common Kashmiris, “govern-
ment employees, the police forces, the academic 
intelligentsia and even some top bureaucrats sup-
ported the separatist slogans raised by the militants.” 
The situation worsened to the extent that it became a 
question of re-establishing the Indian state’s writ over 
Kashmir.
In order to eradicate this armed militancy in the 
state, the Indian security forces resorted to force. The 
security forces used draconian measures, including 
identification parades, house-to-house searches, cus-
todial killings, illegal detention, rape and molestation 
of Kashmiri women, and related coercive methods. 
The counter attacks by the militants were equally 
vicious, and as a result thousands of people were 
killed and numerous others physically and mentally 
disabled. Property worth billions of rupees was 
destroyed, as a large number of houses and even total 
localities were ravaged during encounters or exchange 
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of fire between the Indian security forces and the 
armed militants. 
As a result, for the first time since 1947, the Kash-
miri separatist movement took recourse to a violent 
upsurge with significant mass support. Kashmir 
had witnessed the politics of protest and separatism 
earlier, and at times even militant organizations were 
formed, but they failed to mobilize mass support. 
In the 1990s, the situation was different; there was a 
complete disruption of the administrative machinery 
and the state was brought under Presidential rule for 
six years from 1990-1996. During this period there 
was a complete political vacuum as almost all the 
pro-Indian political parties became dormant or irrel-
evant. The separatists floated their own organizations. 
Elections were held in 1996 for the state legislative 
assembly, resulting in the National Conference (NC) 
led by Farooq Abdullah forming the government. 
But the low voter turnout and the unending violence 
in the state rendered the government completely 
impotent. Besides, the failure of the government to 
fulfill its election promises—including the restoration 
of autonomy to the state, ending human rights viola-
tions, relief to the victims of violence, safe return of 
Kashmiri hindus to their homes, and an end to the 
unemployment problems—made it unpopular. Thus 
in the 1990s, the armed movement gained momen-
tum, while good governance remained a far cry, with 
human rights issues assuming significance.
The Challenges of Governance in 
Contemporary Kashmir
Elections were again held in 2002 for the J&K state 
legislative assembly. These elections are considered to 
be important for the following reasons: first, despite a 
boycott call by the separatists, more then 34 percent 
of eligible voters participated in the elections; second, 
the strongest regional party of J&K—the National 
Conference—was voted out of power and a new 
coalition government led by the Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP) and the Congress came to power under 
the leadership of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. 
During the election campaign Mufti’s PDP 
assured the people that if voted to power, it would 
work for good governance and release of prison-
ers, provide relief to the victims of violence, create 
conditions for the return of Kashmiri migrants to 
their native homes and rehabilitation of surrendered 
militants, repeal those laws which give unlimited 
powers to the Indian security forces, create employ-
ment opportunities for the unemployed, work for 
demilitarization, and finally strive to achieve an hon-
orable solution to the Kashmir problem according to 
the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 
After taking the reigns of government, Mufti 
described all such ideas as elements of his “healing 
touch philosophy.” Since the unending violence of 
the past several years had brought large-scale trouble 
and trauma to the people of the state, “healing touch” 
has been described as a systematic process to heal up 
their wounds. The significant voter turnout in the 
2002 elections was an indication of the fact that the 
people were expecting that the formation of a new 
government in J&K would usher in a new era of 
peace and prosperity. 
Unfortunately, an assessment of the performance 
of the Mufti-led coalition government would reveal 
that it failed to fulfill the people’s expectations. 
Mufti’s promises also proved to be Machiavellian in 
nature. The corruption and misuse of official posi-
tions by the bureaucrats and politicians continued 
unabatedly. The demolition drive launched against 
illegal construction on state land ultimately turned 
into a campaign against poor people and not against 
the illegal construction of rich drones. The number 
of unemployed persons in the state crossed over the 
two hundred thousand mark. The record of human 
rights violations reached an all time high. Custodial 
killings increased by three times as compared to the 
era of Farooq’s government. The plight of Kashmiri 
migrants did not change and they could not return 
to their respective homes despite the tall claims of the 
government that normalcy had been restored. The 
council of ministers was expanded up to 45 percent 
of the total strength of the state assembly. 
however, Mufti’s government cannot be ignored 
in terms of its positive role in supporting the ongoing 
peace process between India and Pakistan. During 
Mufti’s tenure in office, the peace process gained 
momentum and the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus 
service was opened for the passengers of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
After completion of its three years, the PDP 
handed over the chief minister post to its coalition 
partner, the Congress Party, in 2005. The immediate 
challenges of the Congress-led coalition government 
were to work for the rehabilitation of victims affected 
by the October 2005 earthquake, and carry forward 
the common minimum program agreed between the 
coalition parties. New Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi 
Azad assured a clean administration to the state, and 
announced the launching of a crusade against corrup-
tion and nepotism, which would thus work towards a 
Khushal (developed) state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Unfortunately, Azad’s campaign against corrup-
tion also proved to be merely a hoax, as not only the 
top bureaucrats and police officers but also some 
ministers of his government have been described as 
involved in corruption and exploitation of Kashmiri 
women in a sex scandal. Although during his tenure 
two Round Table Conferences have been held on 
Kashmir, nevertheless the peace process between 
India, Pakistan, and some Kashmiri separatists lost 
its pace, with Azad apparently pursuing the policy 
of the Congress Party and thus viewing the Kashmir 
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crisis merely as a law and order problem. This is pos-
sibly the reason why most of the Kashmiris have lost 
their interest in the ongoing peace process within the 
Indian state. Moreover, the worsening of the relations 
between the two coalition partners has also affected 
the administrative performance of the Azad govern-
ment, resulting in its diminishing popularity among 
Kashmiris.
Meanwhile the violence in Kashmir is continuing 
unabatedly, causing significant damage to the lives 
and property of innocent people. This continuous 
destruction of lives and property is not helping the 
changed psychological situation in the Valley, where 
there is a sincere desire amongst the Kashmiri people 
to end the violence, and an earnest belief that the 
conflict in Kashmir could be resolved only through 
a meaningful process of political negotiations. This 
trend could be seen in terms of the decline in Kash-
miri Muslims joining the militant groups. Today, the 
indigenous character of the militant movement is 
weakening day by day. 
Conclusion: A Vision for Kashmir’s Future
Kashmir has always remained a bone of contention 
between India and Pakistan. In fact, there are three 
legitimate parties involved in this conflict—India, 
Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir. Each party has 
taken its own position on the question of Kashmir. 
For India, Kashmir is one of its integral parts, 
and hence this aspect is not open for dispute. For 
Pakistan, Kashmir represents a problem of parti-
tion, which is yet to be resolved. But for the people 
of J&K, Kashmir is not simply a territorial dispute 
between India and Pakistan, and cannot be resolved 
without the involvement of those who are the main 
party in this dispute. None of the parties involved 
in the dispute has shown any flexibility at any time 
in their stated positions on Kashmir, and as a result 
the dispute continued until it assumed the greatest 
degree of ferocity and finally became, in recent years, 
a nuclear flash point. All of the bilateral agreements 
signed over the years between different parties have 
proven to be exercises in futility. 
The fresh negotiations launched between India 
and Pakistan and also between India and some 
Kashmiri separatists have generated positive hope in 
the region. It is largely believed that if the concerned 
parties will continue the process of negotiations by 
talking to one another—with more flexibility and 
exploring options beyond their stated positions—
they will succeed in finding an acceptable solution to 
the vexed Kashmir problem. The new initiative has 
also generated a heated debate among many circles 
about the final solution of Kashmir. In this regard, 
numerous potential solutions are being proposed and 
discussed. however, in the given circumstances, the 
only possible solution is one in which every party will 
find itself in a win-win position. This objective can be 
achieved only after the re-unification of the divided 
state of Jammu and Kashmir and then giving it a sub-
sovereign status. 
The areas that are under Pakistan’s control, includ-
ing Gilgit and Baltistan, should be brought together 
with the areas under India’s control (leaving Aksai 
Chin, which China will never return). Both Indian 
and Pakistani forces could jointly man the interna-
tional border of the re-united Jammu and Kashmir. 
The currency of both countries could be acceptable in 
the state. Both would also speak in all international 
and regional fora on behalf of Jammu and Kashmir 
and thus manage its foreign affairs together. In view 
of its heterogeneous character, the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir would adopt a democratic polity 
based on the federal structure. In this way, the new 
sub-sovereign or semi-sovereign state of Jammu and 
Kashmir could act as a virtual bridge between India 
and Pakistan and would pave the way for peace, prog-
ress, and prosperity in the entire region of South Asia, 
which otherwise seems to be a distant dream. Thus, 
by working in close collaboration with one another, 
the three parties can become close friends and after a 
gap of few years can also think on the lines of grant-
ing the semi-sovereign state of Jammu and Kashmir 
complete sovereign status.
Dr. Mehraj Hajni is a Lecturer at Government Degree 
College in Kargil.
 Today, the indigenous 
character of the Kashmiri 
militant movement is 
weakening.
 Kashmir is not simply a 
territorial dispute between 
India and Pakistan, and 
cannot be resolved without 
the involvement of those who 
are the main party in this 
dispute.
 India, Pakistan, and 
the Kashmiris will find 
themselves in a win-win 
situation only after the 
re-unification of the divided 
state of Jammu and Kashmir 
and then giving it a sub-
sovereign status.
15
The international community’s efforts to help resolve 
the Kashmir issue began only weeks after the dispute 
erupted in October 1947. The controversy remained 
on the world’s radar scope for a quarter of a century, 
then faded away when India and Pakistan agreed at 
Simla in 1972 to resolve it peacefully by bilateral 
negotiations. The outbreak of an insurrection against 
Indian rule in the Kashmir Valley at the end of 1989 
returned the problem to world attention. The United 
States and other major powers soon recognized that 
the nuclear capabilities of the rival claimants made 
the issue more dangerous and its resolution more 
urgent. But Washington’s main initiatives in recent 
years have focused on managing the India-Pakistan 
crises Kashmir has sparked, not on the elusive search 
for resolution of the Kashmir dispute itself. It has 
urged both countries to reach a mutually acceptable 
settlement that takes into account the wishes of the 
Kashmiri people, and has declared its willingness to 
play a facilitating role in helping the parties resolve 
the issue if both the Indians and Pakistanis wish it to. 
Other interested powers have been even less involved. 
All have recognized that the continuing refusal of the 
Indian government to countenance an international 
role in Kashmir makes it likely that any outside 
efforts will be as unsuccessful as others were in the 
past. 
This conventional—and till now sensible—
approach may not necessarily remain valid. In this 
article, I will argue that recent important develop-
ments may—just may—offer opportunities for the 
world community led by the United States to play 
a useful part in resolving this seemingly intractable 
problem.
Failure at the United Nations
The international community’s involvement in the 
Kashmir dispute is a history of repeated frustration 
and failure. Ironically, in light of India’s later nega-
tive attitude toward “internationalizing” the issue, 
it was New Delhi that first brought Kashmir before 
the United Nations in January 1948, a few weeks 
after a series of events in the state that the claimants 
interpret in wildly different ways triggered a dispute 
still with us sixty years later.  
The United States and Britain quickly took the 
lead in the Security Council’s efforts to resolve the 
issue. In the Truman administration’s view, the 
dispute seemed tailor-made for the fledgling organi-
zation’s role as a crisis-manager and problem-solver. 
Initially, Washington tended to defer to London as 
the leader of the Commonwealth and the subconti-
nent’s recent imperial master. Other nations played 
lesser, supporting roles, generally backing U.S.-British 
initiatives and providing experienced diplomats for 
a succession of special missions. In the earliest stages 
the Soviet Union generally stood aloof, though it 
increasingly came to favor the Indian position. 
Much of the early action focused on the activities 
of the five-member United Nations Commission for 
India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The commission even-
tually adopted resolutions calling for a ceasefire, with-
drawal of forces, and an internationally-supervised 
plebiscite in which the Kashmiri people would decide 
whether to join India or Pakistan. A third option, 
independence, was excluded. Aside from the ceasefire, 
the UNCIP resolutions were never implemented. 
Indian stonewalling was principally to blame: despite 
its official position, New Delhi did not want a plebi-
scite and was satisfied with the status quo, which gave 
it the key Kashmir Valley. A series of high-level mis-
sions under UN auspices were similarly unproductive 
in bringing about a settlement. The UN was able to 
set up a military observers’ group stationed along the 
ceasefire line. The contingent played a helpful role in 
calming the situation along the line, at least until the 
second India-Pakistan War in 1965.
The Eisenhower administration’s 1954 decision to 
enlist Pakistan in the Western security alliance system 
effectively ended any lingering hope that U.S.-led 
efforts at the UN could produce a Kashmir settle-
ment. In Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s view, 
the Cold War had come to the subcontinent. The 
Soviet decision to fully endorse India’s position on 
Kashmir made it certain that Moscow would veto any 
proposed UN Kashmir resolution not acceptable to 
New Delhi. If Washington kept on promoting a role 
for the UN, it was only to keep its new ally Pakistan 
reasonably happy, not because it believed that any 
progress could be made. Other countries recognized 
the impossibility of resolving the dispute and stayed 
aloof.
Efforts by Major Powers
America, Britain, and the Soviet Union also made 
efforts outside the United Nations to resolve or 
contain the dispute. Two U.S. presidents became 
personally engaged. In the late 1950s, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower weighed in to promote U.S. supervised 
India-Pakistan negotiations on a basket of crucial 
issues including Kashmir. The Indians rejected 
this intervention. Eisenhower’s successor, John 
F. Kennedy, concluded that India’s defeat by the 
Chinese in the 1962 border war put a settlement 
within reach. The failure of Indian and Pakistani 
negotiators to make any progress in six rounds of 
discussion in which the United States and Britain 
became increasingly involved proved him wrong. 
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Moscow’s turn came in 1966, when Alexei 
Kosygin, the Soviet premier, engineered an agreement 
at Tashkent that ended the second India-Pakistan 
War. But that pact merely restored the status quo ante 
bellum. It did not come to grips with the underlying 
issue of Kashmir’s political future that had triggered 
the war.
Later International Efforts
The Tashkent conference was the last serious involve-
ment by outside powers in the Kashmir issue until 
it exploded again onto the world stage at the end of 
1989. In the following eighteen years, the United 
States again took the lead in international efforts to 
deal with the dispute and, more specifically, with a 
series of India-Pakistan crises the issue generated. 
President Bill Clinton’s personal role in 1999 in 
persuading Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw 
Pakistani forces from the Kargil area of Indian-
administered Kashmir was only the most dramatic 
of several high-level U.S. interventions. But neither 
America nor any other country did much more than 
urge the two claimants to reach a settlement bilater-
ally. The most significant international call, orches-
trated by Washington, came following the 1998 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests, when the 
Security Council and the Group of Eight urged New 
Delhi and Islamabad to return to the negotiating 
table. But as noted, the Clinton and George W. Bush 
administrations maintained that they were prepared 
to play a more active “facilitating” role only if India 
and Pakistan wanted them to. No other countries 
went even that far. 
New Delhi continued to resist internationalizing 
the issue and rejected Washington’s offers. India 
had long since recognized that its bringing Kashmir 
before the United Nations in 1948 was a blunder and 
concluded that as the militarily stronger status quo 
power it was in its interest to deal with the dispute 
bilaterally if at all. By the same token, Pakistan has 
believed at least since 1965 that only international 
intervention could change the political geography of 
the state—though it has at times stirred up trouble in 
Kashmir in the hope that this would lead the world 
to take the action it desired. But neither government 
has yet taken into full account the impact the nuclear 
tests have had on international consideration of the 
dispute. These explosions led the world community 
to focus on maintaining the stability of the subcon-
tinent and lessened the importance it attached to the 
equities of the Kashmir issue. For the United States 
and other countries, the use of violence to change 
the status quo had become an unacceptable option in 
nuclear-armed South Asia. This attitude gave the Line 
of Control a “sanctity” it had not enjoyed before, to 
India’s advantage.
Fresh Possibilities for an International Role
Against this discouraging six-decade background, 
what role can the United States and other countries 
play beyond cheering the two sides on from the side-
lines and helping defuse crises? Several developments 
have occurred in recent years that seem to argue for 
a more active international approach. Washington 
would need to take the lead in any such initiative. 
Other countries could help. Moscow could use its 
influence in New Delhi to persuade the Indians to 
be more forthcoming. Beijing could be helpful in 
Islamabad. Pakistan still views China as its most 
reliable friend among the major powers even though 
the Chinese no longer endorse the Pakistani position 
on Kashmir and urge, as the United States does, 
that India and Pakistan settle the dispute bilaterally. 
The European Union led by Britain should also be 
enlisted, and some Muslim countries might have 
some weight with the Pakistanis. The smaller South 
Asian nations should not be counted on. Anxious not 
to offend either India or Pakistan, they have taken 
advantage of the “no-bilateral dispute” provision of 
the rules of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) and have consistently kept 
their heads down on Kashmir. They will continue to 
do so. In short, it is only the United States that has 
the combination of political clout and diplomatic and 
economic resources to undertake the heavy lifting 
needed to persuade India and Pakistan to cross the 
elusive finish line and agree to a settlement.
Why should Washington undertake such a thank-
less task? I would cite four considerations: 
1. The United States and India have dramatically 
strengthened their relations and developed a serious 
strategic partnership. This may lessen India’s 
long-standing, knee-jerk opposition to any role 
for Washington in the Kashmir issue. It may also 
help New Delhi to recognize, as it should have 
since the Kargil crisis in 1999, that greater U.S. 
involvement could actually be beneficial from its 
viewpoint. The improvement in U.S.-India rela-
tions has not come at the expense of American ties 
with Pakistan, which remain strong. 
2.  India’s ambition to play a major role on the interna-
tional stage has heightened. In the past, the unre-
solved Kashmir issue has detracted from India’s 
image and lessened its prospects for major power 
status and the permanent seat on an expanded 
UN Security Council that Indians believe should 
go with it. Now that India’s breakneck economic 
growth has made its gaining a place at the inter-
national high table a more achievable goal, it may 
see Kashmir as an obstacle to the recognition it 
seeks and be more prepared to rid itself of this 
“albatross.”  
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3.  A Kashmir settlement has become even more impor-
tant to American interests in South Asia and beyond. 
As noted, Washington has feared that another 
conflict between the two over Kashmir could 
escalate into a nuclear war ever since India and 
Pakistan acquired the capacity to develop nuclear 
weapons in the 1990s. Following 9/11, the critical 
role of Pakistan in shaping the future of Afghani-
stan and otherwise contributing to the global 
war against terrorism has given the dispute even 
more dangerous dimensions in the U.S. view. The 
continuing patronage Pakistani intelligence agen-
cies provide Islamic extremists in Kashmir makes 
it more difficult both politically and militarily for 
Islamabad to help the United States and its coali-
tion partners combat these forces on the Afghan 
frontier and elsewhere in Pakistan. Continued 
Pakistan-supported armed Islamic extremism in 
Kashmir also has an adverse impact on Pakistani 
political stability, another major U.S. interest.
4. India’s and Pakistan’s positions on the terms of a 
settlement have grown closer. The two sides have 
been discussing Kashmir in formal dialogue and 
through a regular back-channel for more than 
three years. Though the exchanges have resulted 
in only limited progress, both governments have 
been willing to continue them. They have also 
adopted useful confidence-building measures 
such as the opening of the Line of Control to the 
movement of people and goods. Their present 
determination to carry on despite disappoint-
ments, particularly for the Pakistanis, sharply 
contrasts to the long spells when New Delhi 
and Islamabad could find no basis for discussing 
Kashmir and other India-Pakistan problems.
In the process, both countries, but especially 
Pakistan, have floated ideas that bring their positions 
closer together on several key issues. President Pervez 
Musharraf ’s publicly stated willingness to give up 
Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite and his conditional 
acceptance of the Line of Control as the permanent 
India-Pakistan border in Kashmir are historic events. 
The government of Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh, for its part, has gone farther than its predeces-
sors in welcoming and initiating confidence build-
ing measures concerning Kashmir as well as other 
aspects of India-Pakistan relations. Like Musharraf, 
Singh says he wants to make the Line of Control 
“irrelevant.” There has been useful but inconclusive 
discussion on both sides about establishing joint 
institutions or mechanisms that would operate 
throughout the state and deal with a range of non-
controversial matters in which Kashmiris on both 
sides of the line share an interest. Tourism, forestry, 
and hydrology are some possible subjects. There has 
also been some talk of setting up a joint legislative 
consultative body. So far those who favor such coop-
erative arrangements have not defined the powers and 
responsibilities of the proposed bodies.
Caveats
Despite this progress, important gaps remain. India’s 
informal response to Musharraf ’s call for greater 
self-governance for Kashmiris has been to equate it 
with the powers all Indian states enjoy. In addition, 
any serious discussion on this issue between New 
Delhi and “its” Kashmiris will be complicated by the 
unwillingness of the hindu majority in Jammu and 
the Buddhist majority in Ladakh to accept political 
arrangements they fear would subjugate them to the 
Muslims of the Kashmir Valley. 
The two sides remain at an impasse on disarma-
ment. The Indians insist that they can only reduce or 
redeploy their armed forces in the state if Pakistan-
sponsored insurgent activities cease or are sharply 
rolled back. Both tend to speak of disarmament as if 
it were a self-defining term, whereas in fact in would 
have to be defined in negotiations. 
Moreover, the degree to which other Pakistanis 
accept Musharraf ’s proposals or can be persuaded 
to do so is unclear. The president’s “out-of-the-box” 
ideas drew significant opposition when he first raised 
them, though it soon died down. The ideas seem 
likely to arouse even stronger protest should they 
become Pakistan’s formal position. Nor is it certain 
that a successor civilian or military regime would 
accept them. 
But although the prospects of a Kashmir 
settlement have risen and the importance of such 
a resolution is now greater for American interests 
than before, political pressures in Washington and 
Islamabad make such a role inadvisable at this point. 
For the United States to play a more active part will 
require both policy space and time. The lame-duck 
Bush administration, overstretched by Iraq and other 
foreign policy problems more immediately pressing 
than Kashmir, has neither. The Pakistani and Indian 
governments also need to feel secure enough to take 
the political risks inevitable in a settlement. Fight-
ing for his political life, Musharraf cannot take on 
this added challenge. And India, which as the status 
quo power has never been in a hurry to resolve the 
dispute, is not likely to view a weakened Musharraf 
or a fledgling insecure civilian or military successor as 
reliable negotiating partners.
So until more propitious circumstances arise in 
Washington, Islamabad, and New Delhi, the United 
States should maintain its present policy of watchful 
waiting. 
Bases for a Settlement
The new U.S. administration that takes office in 
2009, however, should look for opportunities to 
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play a more active part. Should it undertake such an 
intervention, its efforts should be designed to help 
the parties reach a settlement that will include several 
key elements: 
•	 The Line of Control, or something geographically 
close to it, will become the permanent border 
between Indian and Pakistani Kashmir. 
•	  The border will be sufficiently porous to allow for 
the easy movement of people and goods across it. 
•	  Kashmiris on both sides of the line will be 
granted a greater degree of self-government. 
•	  Joint institutions will be established on an 
all-Kashmir basis to play a role in managing non-
controversial matters affecting Kashmiris on both 
sides.
American officials should work quietly, suggest-
ing useful building blocks to the parties to help them 
achieve a settlement along these lines. They can act 
as a sounding board, advising each side of the likely 
acceptability to the other of proposals it is consider-
ing putting on the negotiating table. But Americans 
should not sit at the negotiating table—a bad idea 
and one the Indians will not accept. Keeping to an 
informal, unobtrusive role they will want to discour-
age any public discussion of their activities. As the 
negotiations are likely to be protracted, Washington 
and its diplomats in the field should accept that they 
are in it for the long haul, keep patient, and repress 
the natural American preference for swift results.
Despite its improved relations with the United 
States, India will be more wary of an outsider’s role 
than Pakistan. Washington needs to look for ways to 
persuade New Delhi to accept an agreement that does 
not meet all of India’s demands. An offer of strong 
and active U.S. backing for a permanent Indian UN 
Security Council seat could be one approach worth 
weighing. Washington might also usefully consider 
providing support to some of the proposed joint 
mechanisms in Kashmir by establishing with the 
World Bank and other potential donors a special 
fund for Kashmir reconstruction. It should also enlist 
other countries to brace its efforts while recogniz-
ing that it will have to bear the major international 
burden. Similarly, it will need to find creative ways to 
persuade the Pakistanis that a settlement that offers 
little or no change in the geographic status quo in 
Kashmir is worth their while. 
Even under improved political circumstances a 
diplomatic initiative to resolve Kashmir is far from 
a sure bet, so Washington should keep it expecta-
tions appropriately modest. If there is any lesson to 
be drawn from the events of the past six decades it is 
that the Kashmir issue is complex and difficult and 
needs to be addressed with due respect for its tortured 
history. 
By giving India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri 
people the added push they need to get them across 
the elusive finish line, Washington supported by 
others may be able to provide major help to bring 
to an acceptable conclusion a dangerous, seemingly 
intractable problem that has undermined Indian and 
Pakistani interests, played havoc with the lives of the 
Kashmiri people, caused serious political problems 
for the United States and the international commu-
nity, and made the state a potential tinder-box for 
nuclear war.
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Perceptions about the People’s Republic of China’s 
position on Kashmir have long been associated with 
its “all-weather” friendship with Pakistan. however, 
the PRC’s positions on Kashmir have never been 
consistently pro-Pakistan, instead changing from 
disinterest in the 1950s to open support for the Paki-
stani position in the subsequent decades to greater 
neutrality in the 1980s and since. While China has 
continued military support to Pakistan even during 
military conflicts and near-conflicts between India 
and Pakistan, its stance on Kashmir has shifted 
gradually in response to the prevailing domestic, 
regional, and international situations.
Background
Following the partition of the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir in 1947, it was two years before the Com-
munists put the Nationalists to flight and came to 
power in Beijing. The PRC’s interest in Kashmir 
developed gradually following its take-over of Tibet 
in 1950 and its related claims in Aksai Chin in 
Ladakh on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K) and hunza and the Shaksgam Valley in Paki-
stan Occupied Kashmir (POK).
Following the war with India in 1962, China 
began supporting “self-determination” in Kashmir 
and even provided material support via Pakistan for a 
brief period. Following the 1965 war between India 
and Pakistan, this assistance was ended even though 
political support continued until Deng Xiaoping 
shifted the policy towards one of greater neutrality in 
the late 1970s. Nevertheless, Pakistan continued to 
be important to China’s strategic calculus in South 
Asia. Beijing consistently helped arm Pakistan with 
both conventional and nuclear weapons through 
much of the 1980s and 1990s and this military 
cooperation with Pakistan did not cease during either 
the Kargil crisis of 1999 or the year-long military 
buildup along the Indo-Pak border in 2002 (called 
Operation Parakram in India). Even if the case may 
be made that such support to Pakistan has strength-
ened Pakistan’s hands on the Kashmir dispute, it is 
difficult to draw a direct link between the twists and 
turns in the Kashmir situation and Chinese arms 
supplies to Pakistan. Further, China has for over two 
decades consistently called for a peaceful resolution 
of the Kashmir dispute, terming it a dispute “left over 
from history.” Both during Kargil and Operation 
Parakram, China refused to endorse the Pakistani 
positions or to raise the issue at the United Nations. 
Coupled with rising trade and the continuing border 
dialogue between India and China, this has given rise 
to hopes in India that the Kashmir dispute will no 
longer be a card the Chinese will use against it. 
China and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
The Karakoram highway (KKh) connecting Gilgit 
and Kashgar has served as a vital strategic lifeline 
of Sino-Pakistan relations. While trade continues 
to be limited along the highway, the Chinese have 
pledged considerable amounts in aid to widen and 
repair the KKh and to connect it to Pakistan’s exist-
ing highway network so as to improve connectivity 
with the Pakistani coast. Any altruistic intentions 
aside, maintaining the KKh in working condition 
right through the year is an important part of the 
Chinese strategy to reduce its dependence on oil 
supplies through the Malacca Straits and instead have 
them routed through alternative corridors such as 
via Gwadar. China must also be hoping to plug into 
additional road networks planned between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan and further onwards to Central Asia 
as part of enhancing its strategic reach in South and 
Central Asia and to keep an eye on developments 
there. 
The Chinese have also invested in other infra-
structure projects in different parts of the Northern 
Areas, including hydro-power projects, water-
diversion channels and telecommunication facilities. 
Economic links between the Northern Areas and the 
Chinese province of Xinjiang are limited and depend 
almost entirely on the overland route. however, 
links between Xinjiang and other parts of Pakistan 
are picking up as trade delegations from the former 
visit the Pakistani cities of Islamabad, Rawalpindi, 
and Karachi regularly and Pakistani delegations visit 
Urumqi. The habib Bank of Pakistan has an office 
in Beijing but is also owner of a 20 percent stake in 
the Urumqi City Commercial Bank (UCCB) that it 
acquired in February 2006.
One of the major concerns the Chinese have had 
in recent years in its relations with Pakistan has been 
the fear of Islamic fundamentalism originating in that 
country, which helped radicalize Uighur separatists 
in Xinjiang in the 1990s and which probably has at 
China and Kashmir*
by  JABIN T.  JACOB
*For the purposes of this paper, “Kashmir” refers to all of 
the different parts of the erstwhile kingdom of Jammu and 
Kashmir, namely Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, and Baltistan, 
unless specifically stated otherwise. The Indian side will 
continue to be referred to as Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and 
comprises parts of all four with Baltistan represented in the 
main by Kargil, Drass and Turtuk. The Pakistani side will be 
referred to as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and com-
prises the major portion of Baltistan, now referred to as the 
Northern Areas, and a separate administrative unit that goes 
under the name of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).
 China’s positions on 
Kashmir have never been 
consistently pro-Pakistan, 
instead changing from dis-
interest in the 1950s to open 
support for the Pakistani 
position in the subsequent 
decades to greater neutrality 
in the 1980s and since.
 The PRC’s interest in 
Kashmir developed gradually 
following its take-over of 
Tibet in 1950 and its related 
claims to territory on both 
the Indian and Pakistani 
sides of Jammu and 
Kashmir.
 China has for over two 
decades consistently called 
for a peaceful resolution of 
the Kashmir dispute, terming 
it a dispute “left over from 
history.”
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least partly contributed to China’s changed stance 
on the Kashmir dispute. It has to be remembered 
that Chinese arms that were funneled into Afghani-
stan in the 1980s, via the KKh to be used against 
the Soviets, eventually found their way back into 
Xinjiang via the same route and were used by Uighur 
separatists. It was no surprise, therefore, that when 
the bilateral trade agreement China had signed with 
Pakistan in 1963 lapsed in 2000, the Chinese did not 
renew it for over three years. Border trade has also 
been affected by the increased number of check-posts 
and greater Chinese vigilance at the borders. yet 
another Chinese concern has been the smuggling of 
narcotics through this border.
Nevertheless, for all its concerns, it is likely that 
China will, for the foreseeable future, continue to 
consider Pakistan important for its primary role as 
a counter to India and because the KKh is likely 
to figure increasingly in China’s plans for strategic 
outreach.
China and Jammu & Kashmir
It is the memory of India’s loss to China in the 1962 
conflict, the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in 
Ladakh, and claims over Arunachal Pradesh in India’s 
east that are the biggest spurs to India’s anti-China 
lobby. It appears, however, that over time the stra-
tegic importance of Aksai Chin to the Chinese has 
declined vis-à-vis that of Arunachal. At one level, it 
might be argued that things can hardly change given 
that the Sino-Indian border dispute is unlikely to be 
resolved except in its entirety, but at another level, it 
needs to be seen whether simply waiting for the big 
steps towards resolution is enough. In this context, 
Ladakh perhaps provides the ideal location for experi-
menting with ways of carrying forward Sino-Indian 
relations and for exploring new approaches towards 
an eventual resolution of the boundary dispute.
Ladakh, which has historically had close links to 
Tibet and Xinjiang, lost these in 1962, and has over 
the years receded into the background of the Indian 
imagination. Leh, the Ladakhi capital, once served 
as the hub of the Silk Route trade into undivided 
India, but a combination of the British preference for 
Gilgit as the focus of Sino-Indian trade and later, of 
the Sino-Indian war led to Ladakh losing its former 
preeminence and turning heavily dependent on 
Indian central government subsidies and fair-weather 
tourism for economic sustenance.
The way forward for Ladakh hinges primarily 
on two factors: better infrastructure development 
and connectivity, and increased tourist inflow. On 
the first, the Indian government has begun to move 
with greater vigor of late but tourism is also affected 
by the anachronistic Inner Line permits that are 
still required for access to areas closer to the Line of 
Actual Control (LAC) and which continue to close 
off huge chunks of Ladakh to anyone but scarce local 
populations and the Indian Army. While the Indian 
government is beginning to shed its previous inhibi-
tions about building roads along the LAC, this has 
run into strenuous opposition from the Chinese, even 
as the latter have expanded and modernized infra-
structure on their side of the LAC. This has stymied 
Indian efforts but it also needs to be asked if the 
Inner Line permits and exclusive use largely by Indian 
armed forces form part of the reason for Chinese 
protestations. Perhaps if the region were thrown open 
more freely to tourists, the Chinese would be able to 
object far less to Indian road-building efforts. 
Foreign tourists are more important for the 
Ladakhi tourist economy at present than are Indian 
tourists, but this situation is likely to change were 
the Leh-Manasarovar pilgrim route reopened. This 
route connecting Ladakh with Mt. Kailash and 
Lake Manasarovar—holy sites for both hindus and 
Buddhists—passes through disputed territory via the 
last Indian outpost of Demchok. So far the Chinese 
have been reluctant to give the go-ahead to the route, 
perhaps because of the limited economic gains for 
themselves—the Chinese do not want to lose tourism 
to Kailash-Manasarovar on their side that contributes 
to local economies all the way from Lhasa. Mean-
while, smuggling contributes to the local economy 
on both sides of the LAC with thermos flasks and 
blankets entering Ladakh from Tibet and Indian tea 
headed in the other direction.
A case could also be made for the reopening of 
border trade via the Karakoram Pass that provides 
Ladakh’s opening to Xinjiang, even if the route 
presents greater difficulties for road-building than 
the Leh-Manasarovar one. This route, also one of the 
axes of the Silk Route, would pass through the Nubra 
Valley and the last Indian outpost of Daulat Beg Oldi 
onwards to Kashgar and would certainly prove an 
instant attraction for tourists. 
China’s Interests in the Kashmir Dispute 
Its current professed neutrality apart, China retains 
a continuing interest in the resolution of the dispute 
for several reasons. First, the status of the over 2,000 
square miles of territory ceded by Pakistan to China 
under the Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement of 1963 
would come up for renegotiation under the terms 
of the Agreement if India and Pakistan resolved 
their dispute over Kashmir and India became the 
sovereign power over the ceded area. Second, in the 
event of a resolution and India regaining control over 
the Northern Areas, this would cut all land connec-
tions between China and Pakistan and put traffic 
through the KKh also under Indian control. This 
would imply losses or at least a degree of wariness 
for China on several strategic fronts, including its 
plans of routing energy supplies from West Asia 
 The Chinese have pledged 
considerable amounts in 
aid to widen and repair the 
Karakoram Highway and to 
connect it to Pakistan’s exist-
ing highway network so as to 
improve connectivity with the 
Pakistani coast.
 The Chinese have 
invested in infrastructure 
projects in different parts of 
the Northern Areas, includ-
ing hydro-power projects, 
water-diversion channels and 
telecommunication facilities.
 The Chinese have had a 
fear of Islamic fundamental-
ism originating in Pakistan, 
which helped radicalize 
Uighur separatists in Xinji-
ang in the 1990s.
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through Gwadar. Third, even if resolution of the 
Kashmir dispute comes in the form of an acceptance 
of the current status quo, but with soft borders or 
“irrelevant” borders as is now being mooted, India 
will certainly demand greater access to the Northern 
Areas (and indeed, the rest of Pakistan), beginning 
with economic access, which could challenge Chinese 
plans in the region. But fourth, and more positively, 
resolution—even if on the basis of status quo—can 
actually lead to greater possibilities for economic 
interactions between India and China, as outlined 
above, and certainly these could prove more profit-
able from the Chinese point of view than those with 
Pakistan. Further, there could conceivably be added 
impetus for the resolution of the Sino-Indian bound-
ary dispute as well.
It remains to be seen whether resolution or stale-
mate on the basis of status quo will be the case. In the 
meantime, there have been calls for Chinese involve-
ment in the Kashmir dispute from Kashmiris on both 
sides of the divide. Abdul Majeed Mallick, the former 
Chief Justice of the high Court of Azad Kashmir 
and leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation 
League, has claimed that the Chinese ambassador to 
Pakistan had promised him that China would return 
Aksai Chin if Kashmir were to become independent. 
Similarly, in 2006 during the World Social Forum 
in Karachi, Indian Kashmiri leader and hurriyat 
Chairman Mirwaiz Umer Farooq called for China 
to be made a party to the resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute, since it not only occupies a part of Kashmir, 
but is also one of the major powers in the region. The 
Pakistani Foreign Office, however, ruled out any role 
for China, saying that only India and Pakistan were 
parties to the dispute according to the relevant UN 
resolutions. During his visit to Pakistan in November 
2006, Chinese President hu Jintao too did not refer 
to any Chinese role in the resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute, saying only that his country supported Paki-
stan and India resolving the issue through dialogue. 
however, in December 2006, Umer Farooq repeated 
his call for China’s involvement and indicated that his 
group was thinking of visiting Beijing in this regard.
Prospects for the Future 
It is important to further explore the points made 
above regarding greater interaction in the economic 
sphere among the three countries and in particular 
between India and China, not just in the interest of a 
resolution of the Kashmir dispute but in the interests 
of better relations among all three countries.
China aims to have stability in its neighbor-
hood and increased market penetration in South 
Asia, and for both reasons stability in Kashmir and 
peace between India and Pakistan are essential. 
China’s Western Development Strategy (WDS) for 
its interior provinces including Tibet and Xinjiang 
make it imperative that there is peace and stability on 
the borders of these provinces as they aim to increase 
their external trade and serve as major hubs for trade 
with China’s western neighbors.
China has hitherto been viewed in the countries 
of South Asia largely either in terms of the strategic 
potential it provided vis-à-vis another country or in 
terms of the threat that it posed. This latter was the 
case, it must be remembered, even with Pakistan in 
the 1950s and led then-Pakistani President Ayub 
Khan to propose to India a joint defense of the 
subcontinent against the communist threat. As rela-
tions with India deteriorated, Pakistan subsequently 
changed its position to viewing China as a hedge and 
an ally against India. It is time that such short-term 
positions give way to more sustainable grounds 
for the Sino-Pakistan partnership. And economics 
provides the way forward, especially for the North-
ern Areas, which remain among the most neglected 
regions under Pakistani governance.
Similarly, in the case of India, some three decades 
after the diplomatic ice with China was first broken 
and more than a decade since the border agreements 
of 1993 and 1996, there really has not been any great 
progress on the resolution of the boundary dispute. It 
is time that the two countries explored and pushed the 
limits of economic cooperation. While border trade 
between the two countries has been slow in picking 
up at Nathu La on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier in India’s 
east, this has as much to do with infrastructural bottle-
necks as with the lack of political will in New Delhi 
to push things faster. In the context of the possible 
linkages through Ladakh outlined above, it might, 
however, be Beijing that is the more reluctant party.
What both India and Pakistan need to realize is 
that China is at that stage of its economic rise where 
it is looking for greater contacts with markets towards 
its south to balance its dependence on the American 
and European markets. Furthermore, linkages with 
Western markets are not sufficient for the develop-
ment of either Tibet or Xinjiang, whose economies 
need sustained and sustainable links with markets in 
India and Pakistan to really take off. The two South 
Asian neighbors thus have the opportunity today to 
move beyond conflict and use the China “card” to 
mutual benefit for a change. In each of the several 
scenarios outlined above, it is Kashmir that lies right 
at the center of the map and it is about time that 
the region is allowed to shed its troubled history and 
take on a new garb as a hub of peace and economic 
development.
Jabin T. Jacob is a Research Fellow at the Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies and a Ph.D. student special-
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in New Delhi, India.
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Primer: The Economy of Jammu and Kashmir
The economy of Jammu and Kashmir before the 
beginning of the insurgency that beset it in 1990 
had been primarily an agricultural economy. There 
was very little industry (although Kashmiri handi-
crafts created a niche for themselves) and the service 
sector was dominated primarily by tourism. These 
sectors of the economy, which brought in cash to 
the state, depended heavily on customs from the rest 
of India. Apples from the valley of Kashmir found 
their markets elsewhere in India, while tourists from 
different parts of India buoyed local tourism and 
handicrafts. Indeed, given its low population the 
narrowness of Jammu and Kashmir’s domestic market 
could not be expected to support rapid growth of 
the state’s economy. Thus integration with the wider 
national market was of vital importance to the state’s 
economy.   
The manner of this integration was not merely 
a unification of markets but also free transit for 
the citizens from the rest of India. This, it may be 
noted, had been achieved only in 1953—five years 
after the state’s accession—following an agitation 
led by Shyama Prosad Mookherjee, founder of the 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian People’s Union), against 
the identification card rule that was seen to be a 
hindrance to the free entry and exit of people from 
other parts of India. Jammu and Kashmir’s economy 
was therefore tied to the national economy of the 
country. Given the fact that the Indian economy 
did not quite take off in the first three decades after 
independence, neither did that of the state. It may 
be noted that the strengths and weaknesses of the 
state’s economy reflected its terrain. Except for some 
areas in Jammu and the valley, the state is mountain-
ous, ensuring that transport costs would be high. 
Consequently, the state could have a cost advantage 
only with those products where it had a monopoly 
or high value-low volume items where high transport 
costs could be neutralized. The state was and remains 
the highest producer of apples in India, as well as 
a host of dry fruits and traditional handicrafts that 
fitted this criterion. But the state then and even now 
added very little value to raw fruit that it produced, 
thus missing an opportunity to supplement its poor 
creation of gainful employment. Such a step required 
an economic regime that would allow entrepreneurs 
to take advantage of opportunities and set up plants 
and factories as freely as possible. however, India’s 
economic regime prior to 1991 was governed by a 
system of permits and licenses and did not allow for 
Policy Making in a Terrorist 
Economy
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such autonomous efforts on the part of independent 
private agents. Therefore, in spite of tremendous 
potential in terms of raw material available, agro-
industries never took off. Thus, three decades after 
accession, the sectoral composition of the economy 
of Jammu and Kashmir was as described in Figure 1, 
below.
There was marginal change in the decade that fol-
lowed and the overall composition of the Jammu and 
Kashmir economy remained the same.
The onset of insurgency was a major blow to those 
sectors of the economy that were linked to the money 
economy. however, different sectors of the economy 
coped in different ways with the result that the trajec-
tory of evolution of each sector differed dramatically. 
Some sectors were obviously very badly affected. 
Others were forced by circumstances to take steps, as 
a result of which they did amazingly well without any 
government effort. A study of these various sectors 
in a milieu of economic uncertainty and government 
policies in those settings is extremely important for 
a better comprehension of how agents react under 
these circumstances. The lessons learnt from such a 
study have policy implications and are directly linked 
to the possibilities of a peace dividend. 
Sectors Badly Affected: Tourism
The insurgency completely crippled the tourism 
industry in the Kashmir valley. Tourist arrivals that 
had numbered over 700,000 in 1988 and over a 
half-million in 1989 fell to little over ten thousand 
in 1990. Kashmir valley tourism was not to witness 
a return to six figures until 1998, when it barely 
crossed a hundred thousand. It doubled the follow-
ing year but fell off after the Kargil conflict with 
Pakistan that year. The valley remains attractive to 
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tourists even with the threat of terror. Indeed, tourists 
have to be specially targeted by terrorists to dissuade 
them from visiting the valley. The possibility that 
this dissuasion is planned is heightened given that 
the tourist groups chosen for attack (usually grenade 
attacks) have been from West Bengal and Gujarat 
where Kashmir has been a favorite destination. This is 
not to say that the entire state witnessed a decline in 
tourist arrivals. The other regions of the state, Jammu 
and Ladakh, were less affected. In fact, outstation 
tourist arrivals in Jammu rose from two million to 
over four million in the 1990s. Ladakh was of course 
more affected, but numbers never fell precipitously as 
in Kashmir. Jammu’s tourism was pilgrimage tourism 
mainly centered on the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi 
Shrine. But in contrast to Kashmir, the bulk of arriv-
als in Jammu came from a lower economic stratum 
and the amounts that they spent reflected this charac-
teristic. Thus, even as the number of pilgrims to the 
shrine crossed six million in 2006, tourism generated 
only Rs 450 crores (approximately $110 million) for 
the region, a modest sum given the absolute numbers 
involved. 
The Potential Peace Dividend
Tourism as an industry naturally relies on peace 
and stability for sustenance. Tourist arrivals in the 
various regions of the state reflect this, in the sense 
that numbers in each division depend on local law 
and order conditions as well as proximity to conflict 
zones. This is why Ladakh suffers. The peace dividend 
for this sector therefore could be enormous. For one 
the synergies that complementarities between Jammu 
and Kashmir provide could lead to a massive boost 
in tourism in both places but more significantly to 
the valley. Religious pilgrims to the Mata Vaishno 
Devi Shrine or the Shrine of Baba Ghulam Shah 
Badshah at Rajouri (also in Jammu Division) could 
easily travel a bit further—via a new rail link that 
now will connect the Valley to the rest of the country 
for the Vaishno Devi pilgrims, and via the Mughal 
Road for the pilgrimage tourists in Rajouri. Thus 
the Valley would gain by mere proximity to Jammu. 
But more importantly, India’s burgeoning middle 
class—a product of India’s economic liberalization 
policies and a class that is no longer afraid to spend, 
and which seeks to travel to neighboring himachal 
Pradesh to cool off during summer, swelling tourist 
arrivals there to over 5 million—would also look to 
the Valley to cool off. It is well known that Jammu 
and Kashmir has all the geographical features of 
himachal and more to attract tourists of all hues, 
from adventure tourists, to eco-tourists, to religious 
tourists, to those who merely want to “get away.” 
What it does not have is safety and security. This is 
partially true also of those areas of Jammu that would 
compete with the Valley for the same kind of tourists. 
Secondly, these parts of Jammu that border himachal 
Pradesh also lack the necessary infrastructure, with 
existing infrastructure having been severely degraded 
in the 1990s due to neglect forced by the insurgency.
Infrastructure
The 1990s witnessed a sharp decline in infrastruc-
ture availability in the state. Some of this was due to 
sabotage by militants targeting social and physical 
infrastructure. Neglect played its part also, especially 
when it came to assets like roads in hilly terrain with 
considerable precipitation. 
Figure 2 above reflects the impacts of the infra-
structural damage. While transport infrastructure 
damage—that is, vehicles damaged—could be very 
easily replaced, this is not true for roads and bridges. 
Given the fact that the money economy of the state 
is particularly dependent on connectivity with the 
rest of India for its survival, the damage to sectors 
like horticulture was immense. Before the targeting 
of infrastructure, horticulture exports to other states 
had not been affected by militancy. But the years fol-
lowing1993-94 witnessed a precipitous trend, from 
which this sector would recover only in 2000.
This again is not unusual. horticulture is a local 
activity carried out largely with the help of local 
people. horticultural production per se does not 
depend on law and order in the sense that tourism 
does, as local people are not targets of attack by mili-
tants. But when infrastructure is targeted (as shown 
in the figure), the outcome cannot be in doubt. 
however, with the security forces gaining ascendancy 
over the militants in the valley, widespread target-
ing of infrastructure is no longer that easy. More 
importantly, it draws local ire, alienating the very 
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people whose support militants must have to operate 
successfully.
Government Policy and the Creation 
of a Terrorist Economy
The state’s response to an economy damaged by mili-
tancy developed along predicted lines. As in North 
East India, the central government came in with 
packages aimed at reviving the economy through 
grants intended to restore infrastructure as well as 
other parts of the economy. The effect of all this was 
to create an economy whose State Domestic Product 
(SDP) sectoral break-down, as given by Table 1 and 
Figure 3, defied common economic logic. The ulti-
mate twist to this bizarre economic history was the 
revelation by the National Sample Survey Organisa-
tion that Jammu and Kashmir ranked highest of all 
the states when it came to per household asset owner-
ship in the country, with Rs 10.87 lakhs (approxi-
mately $27,650) per household.  
The profile of economic activities, with its accent 
on construction and public administration and sub-
stantial contributions from banking and real estate, 
would be puzzling to most economies. The revela-
tion about asset ownership only compounded the 
puzzle. There is of course little doubt that the massive 
increase in the number of security forces sent to this 
troubled state and the expenditures made locally to 
maintain this force would have an expansionary effect 
on the local economy.
But it also now increasingly clear that as in the 
North East, the economic packages announced by 
the central government would follow a particular 
trajectory that would deliver similar results. As “pack-
ages” and “projects” were announced, the preferred 
vehicles of delivery were contractors who or at least 
whose political patrons reposed their faith in the 
Indian Constitution. The mode of awarding contracts 
remained opaque. Such businessmen soon attracted 
the attention of the militants and became easy targets 
for extortion. It may be argued that there was social 
sanction for this treatment not the least because the 
manner in which these contracts were secured were 
not seen to be above board. The relations built up 
by the businessmen and the extorting militants had 
some serious consequences. As long as the money 
was paid, the business operations of the businessmen 
would not be targeted. This of course assumed that 
the militant who received these sums was capable 
of maintaining sufficient discipline in his cadre to 
prevent others from targeting businessmen who paid 
up. however, should such a person be killed by the 
security forces, it meant that fresh arrangements 
would have to be made between the businessmen and 
the militants who succeeded their slain comrades. 
Indeed, the killings of migrant laborers in June 2006 
happened just after the security forces killed a top 
militant. The killing of the laborers was not an act 
of retribution but a signal that a new set of militants 
had arrived and new “arrangements” would have 
to be made. In short, while the state had in place a 
system of “development” practices aimed at buying 
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Table 1 • Composition of J&K SDP: 2001–2002
Sector Magnitude (Rs crore) (% share)
Agriculture 3902.75 27.64
Forestry and logging 493.84 3.50
Fishing 102.52 0.72
Mining & Quarrying 14.67 0.10
Subtotal: Primary 4513.79 31.96
Manufacturing (reg.) 175.82 1.25
Manufacturing (Unreg.) 550.35 3.90
Construction 2087.66 14.72
Electricity, Gas & Water –478.66 –3.39
Subtotal: Secondary 2326.48 16.47
Transport, Comm. and Trade 720.04 5.10
Trade, Hotel and Rest. 1424.53 10.09
Banking and Insurance 627.42 4.44
Real Estate 773.09 5.47
Public Administration 2184.30 15.47
Other Services 1551.94 10.99
Subtotal: Tertiary 7281.32 51.56
NSDP 14121.59 100
Population 102.83
Per Capita 13733
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the “hearts and minds” of the people, what it ended 
up doing was to make militants richer while at the 
same time entrenching the institution of corruption 
deeper and deeper into the culture of the state. It 
is no wonder then that Transparency International 
India finally ranked the state as “most corrupt,” 
relieving Bihar of this dubious honor.
It is this system of transfers that led to the state 
being a massive consumer of white goods, automo-
biles as well as a source of financial investment, a 
totally unexpected state of affairs for a region bogged 
down in a quagmire of violence for over a decade. 
The poverty ratio for the state had plunged to a very 
low and enviable 3.5%, compared to the national 
average of 26.1%. Of course, military expenditures in 
the state cannot entirely account for this dramatic fall 
in poverty. It must be remembered that unlike most 
parts of India, land holdings were fairly equitable as a 
result of successful land reforms carried out by Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah’s government during his first 
stint as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, 
asset inequality in terms of land holdings had long 
been addressed with its obvious impact on poverty. 
But the fall in poverty rates especially at a time of 
sustained militancy only pointed to open and sur-
reptitious transfers, which while mitigating poverty 
entrenched the already existing system of corruption 
even deeper.
Handicrafts
The sector that did remarkably well during this 
period was the handicrafts sector. Employment in 
this industry increased throughout the 1990s from 
225,000 workers directly employed to 320,000 in 
2001. Since this industry is in private hands, it may 
be assumed that this represented gainful employment. 
The growth occurred at the same time when the total 
number of training centers declined from 635 (1994) 
to 535 (2000). While the total number of coopera-
tives set up to help artisans market their wares almost 
doubled in the 1990s, their combined sales almost 
halved. On the other hand, the state-owned Jammu 
and Kashmir handicrafts Corporation did a far more 
impressive job by upgrading its Management Infor-
mation Systems and ensuring that its total turnover 
increased from Rs 5600 million ($142 million) in 
1994-5 to Rs 8690 million ($220 million) in 2000-1. 
The total expected turnover (domestic sales plus 
exports) in 2007 is in the range of Rs 15,000 million 
($381 million), but there are observers who claim 
that this is a conservative estimate and that the actual 
figure is at least twice this number.
What is noteworthy is that the bulk of this 
trade takes place beyond the aegis of the state and 
through private hands un-aided by the state. This 
again is ironically due to the militancy that swayed 
the state in the 1990s. Itinerant Kashmiri handicraft 
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merchants forced into hawking their wares house-to-
house in many Indian cities became a common sight. 
This strategy was necessitated by the fact that a major 
source of demand—tourists—had stopped visiting 
the valley. Soon Kashmiri handicraft dealers had 
hit upon the novel idea of setting up shop in those 
parts of India where visitors thronged, such as Goa, 
Delhi, and Kerala. Thus, Kashmiri handicrafts facing 
the vicissitudes of militancy adopted such measures 
and tactics whereby they were able to overcome the 
limitations of the market defined by tourist arrivals in 
the Valley and integrate themselves with the national 
and global economy. This sector did so without much 
help from the state and in extremely difficult condi-
tions. They were able to do so because handicrafts 
remain a business where much of the production 
takes place indoors. Curfews do not affect produc-
tion and demands on infrastructure are few. Thus 
production is not affected by militancy. The nature of 
its markets does not call for a “just-in-time” system, 
and as such small disruptions in supply are easily 
absorbed.   
This is in marked contrast to sectors such as small 
and medium scale enterprises, which have not been 
able to wean themselves from generous subsidies to 
compete and integrate with the national market. 
Thus, the state of Jammu and Kashmir represents a 
paradox where sectors that are relatively unaided have 
managed to carve a niche for themselves in the global 
economy, while sectors that are the recipient of state 
largesse have not been able to do so.
Policy Implications 
What policy implications may one derive from India’s 
Kashmir experience viewed through the prism of eco-
nomics? It is clear that the central government’s effort 
to bribe the state into submission has not worked. It 
is also clear from the success stories in the handicraft 
sector that such an approach is not warranted. What 
is needed is a participatory approach to economic 
policy and development. 
The destruction in rural infrastructure, which 
needs to be repaired, should see the involvement 
of village councils (called Halqa Panchayat in the 
state). The centralized manner in which these tasks 
are planned in the state currently involve the District 
Collector, the Members of Legislative Assembly who 
belong to that district, and the Member of Parliament 
under whose constituency that district falls. Popular 
involvement in planning and execution is totally 
absent. While the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the 
Indian Constitution have given constitutional status 
and some financial teeth to the local bodies in the 
rest of India, this is not true in Jammu and Kashmir 
which vide Article 370 has its own constitution. The 
state’s local level bodies are disempowered and elec-
tions are irregular. Thus an important instrument of 
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local empowerment, policy planning, and implemen-
tation is absent. It is doubtful that these bodies will 
be targeted by militants for extortion, as that would 
alienate the very people whose support or at least 
silence is necessary for militancy to thrive. The lack 
of use of local popular bodies to create rural infra-
structure instead of private contractors chosen in a 
centralized manner through dubious means does little 
to reduce popular alienation or re-create infrastruc-
ture. What it leads to is a skewed income and asset 
distribution apart from enriching the militants. Simi-
larly, steps taken in the direction of entrepreneurship 
training among local residents so as to enable them 
to set up enterprises on their own is a more sustain-
able model than setting up state-owned enterprises. 
These activities, especially in the areas of adding value 
to horticultural produce, can do much to generate 
incomes and employment. Making them targets of 
extortion by militants may not be accompanied by 
the same social sanction as in the case of extortion of 
government contractors. 
So far, neither the state government nor the 
central government has moved in this direction, 
although most recently the central government has 
prodded the state government in the direction of 
democratic decentralization. This clearly is an oppor-
tunity lost, as the goal of economic development 
need not be given up even when an insurgency is on. 
But in a milieu where years of “easy money” accentu-
ated by “security concerns” create an impressive 
array of vested interests bolstered by casualty graphs 
that point downwards accompanied by surprisingly 
steady numbers of militants waiting to infiltrate into 
India, resources keep on flowing in the same manner 
and volume as previously. In such circumstances, 
policy shifts—especially radical ones—are the first 
casualties. 
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Water, Wars, and Kashmir
Conflicts over water—a precious resource, the 
supply of which is growing sparser and the demand 
for which is ever mounting—have been much talked 
about by experts. Growing populations and extending 
development would render conflicts between water-
rich and water-scarce nations inevitable. Upstream 
states that control the flow of water to downstream 
states would use this valuable resource as a key dip-
lomatic and strategic tool to coerce the downstream 
nations into submitting to its demands. According to 
the 2002 United Nations World Water Development 
Report, there were 507 conflictive events over water 
during the previous fifty years. Thirty-seven among 
these involved violence, of which 21 consisted of 
military acts (18 between Israel and its neighbors). 
“Some of the most vociferous enemies around the 
world have negotiated water agreements [concerning 
international rivers] or are in the process of doing 
so,” says the report. Global warming would act as a 
catalyst to water-conflict scenarios, with decreasing 
rainfall and increasing evaporation in some areas 
that have made the regular climate patterns erratic. 
Intermittent phases of flooding and droughts causing 
massive human suffering would pressure governments 
into turning off the taps to its neighbors.
The Indus River, whose basin cradled one of the 
oldest civilizations of the world, sustains Pakistan 
today. Both India and Pakistan depend on snow-fed 
rivers that rise in the himalayas. Pakistan depends on 
the Indus for its survival and sustenance. The Indus, 
moreover, passes through Jammu and Kashmir, which 
is in dispute between the two countries. The history 
of water sharing between India and Pakistan has been 
marked by exceptional cooperation and intermittent 
conflicts over the interpretation of the water sharing 
treaty that forms the basis for this cooperation. The 
Tulbul Navigation Project and the Baglihar, Kishan-
ganga, and Salal hydroelectric power projects are a 
few contentious issues between the two countries 
revolving around the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The 
incongruities in interpretations of the IWT have been 
attributed to political motives, rather than differ-
ences over technical and engineering aspects of water 
management.
The Indus Waters Treaty: Emergence of an 
Effective Conflict Management Tool 
The IWT brokered by the World Bank (WB) 
provided for the division of the rivers between 
India and Pakistan. The eastern rivers—Sutlej, Beas 
Kashmir and Water: Conflict and 
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and Ravi—were allocated to India. The western 
rivers—Jhelum, Chenab and Indus—were allotted to 
Pakistan (barring their use by India under specified 
conditions in Jammu and Kashmir), with limited 
consumptive rights over these to India. how did the 
IWT come into being?
In April 1948, the lack of a water-sharing agree-
ment led India to curtail the flow of west flowing 
tributaries to Pakistan. This brought to the fore the 
imperative of negotiations for an equitable distribu-
tion of the Indus River and its tributaries between 
the two riparian states, and for developing a coherent 
plan for integrated development of the water basin. 
The hurried partition of the Indian subcontinent 
through the India Independence Act by British 
Parliament in 1947, under the duress of increasing 
communal violence, resulted in the creation of two 
new independent states, India and Pakistan. The two 
countries, however, were beleaguered by problems 
related to delineation of their international boundar-
ies; accession of a number of princely states, especially 
that of Jammu and Kashmir; as well as the deci-
sions about their complex river systems, the Indus 
(shared by India with West Pakistan) and Ganges and 
Brahmaputra (shared by India with East Pakistan). 
Of these three rivers, the Indus basin—typified by 
thousands of kilometers of man-made irrigation 
canals and headworks that regulated the flow of its 
waters—proved to be the most complicated. What 
exacerbated the problem was the fact that the Indus 
originated from the disputed territory of Jammu and 
Kashmir, the legal status of which both countries 
became involved in war soon after independence 
in 1947. however, the waters irrigated most of the 
fertile lands of Punjab, divided into East and West 
Punjab. 
The existing water turn systems were frozen by a 
“Standstill Agreement” in December 1947 at the two 
headworks of Madhopur (on the Ravi) and Ferozepur 
(on the Sutlej) until March 31, 1948. Upon expiry of 
this agreement on April 1, 1948 and in the absence of 
a new agreement, India discontinued the delivery of 
water to the Dipalpur Canal and the main branches 
of the Upper Bari Daab Canal from these headworks. 
The Arbitral Tribunal (AT) that was set up by the 
Indian Independence Act to look into differences 
over matters of division of assets between the two 
countries also expired on the same day. 
In April 1948, the Engineers of the two divided 
Punjab States met in Simla and signed two Stand-
still Agreements regarding continuous flow from 
two other canals, Depalpur and Central Bari, until 
October 1948. As per this agreement the West 
Punjab provincial government would pay seignior-
age charges and proportionate maintenance costs, 
and interest on a proportionate amount of capital. 
In July 1950, Pakistan stopped seigniorage payments 
to India, which continued to supply water as per the 
agreement. Due to ongoing hostilities between the 
two neighbors on account of Kashmir, no further 
talks were held.
David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority and a former Chairman of 
Atomic Energy Commission, USA visited the two 
countries in 1951 and proposed that India and 
Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and 
operate the Indus Basin river system. Inspired by this 
idea, Eugene R. Black, then President of the World 
Bank, visited the two countries and proposed a 
Working Party of Indian, Pakistani, and World Bank 
engineers to tackle the functional aspects of water 
sharing. The two countries accepted this mediation 
and the World Bank stepped in with its own draft 
proposals for resolution in February 1954, distribut-
ing the three Eastern Rivers to India and the three 
Western rivers to Pakistan. Protracted talks were 
held amid mounting tensions, and finally the Indus 
Waters Treaty was signed by Jawaharlal Nehru, then 
Prime Minister of India; Field Marshal Ayub Khan, 
then President of Pakistan; and W.A.B. Illif, then 
President of the World Bank, in Karachi in Septem-
ber 1960. 
The IWT provided for one of the most compre-
hensive dispute resolution mechanisms. Under the 
IWT, India can undertake projects on the western 
rivers for general conservation, flood control, irriga-
tion and hydropower generation, and duly inform 
Pakistan of the same. Pakistan’s objection would 
render it a matter of dispute to be settled either by 
negotiations or by a neutral expert, or by arbitration. 
Three members, one from India, one from Pakistan 
and the third member by mutual agreement or an 
International Court of Justice appointee in lieu 
would be the arbitrators. Any unresolved “question” 
between the two parties through the Permanent 
Indus Commission becomes a “difference” to be 
referred to a neutral expert, who is appointed by the 
two countries, and failing that, the World Bank. If 
the neutral expert’s recommendations are unaccept-
able to either of the parties, the matter would be 
treated as a “dispute” and it would be referred to a 
Court of Arbitration established by the World Bank, 
along with other institutions such as the secretary 
general of the United Nations.
Water Conflict: Key Issues of Contention
Water sharing between the two neighbors has been 
characterized by intermittent conflict and long 
sustained cooperation. however, recent issues have 
brought the sustainability of the IWT under serious 
scrutiny. Twenty-seven projects undertaken by India 
in the Indus basin in Jammu and Kashmir have been 
questioned by Pakistan. This has resulted in delays in 
implementation, prohibitive increases in costs, and 
stalling of development in J&K. Three of the most 
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contentious issues—the Baglihar hydel Power Project 
(BhP), Tulbul Navigation Project (TNP), and Kish-
enganga Project—are discussed below. 
Baglihar • The 900 megawatt (MW) BhP on the 
Chenab River in Doda district in Jammu stands out 
as a key issue between India and Pakistan. It was also 
the first ever to be referred for international arbitra-
tion through the dispute resolution mechanism under 
Article IX of the IWT. Pakistan feared that the BhP 
would divert considerable downstream flows and 
could also be used to cause floods in the riparian 
areas.
Similar objections were raised by Pakistan over 
Salal, a 480 MW hydropower project on the Chenab 
in 1978, that storage could be used for drying up 
flows as well as for flooding the lower riparian states. 
however, any attempt to flood Pakistan would inun-
date the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) 
first. Such action would also run counter to the rules 
of war and against the Geneva Conventions, inviting 
international condemnation. It is highly unlikely, 
therefore, that India would indulge in such an act 
and such fears are thus unfounded. India’s agreement 
to make design changes in the Salal dam has resulted 
in severe siltage problems and India was wary of a 
repetition of the same.
In response to Pakistan’s objections over the 
BhP, India contended that as it was a run of the 
river project, the water utilized for power genera-
tion would be released back into the river stream 
and therefore there would be no difference in the 
quantum of water release. Both India and Pakistan 
tried to resolve the issue through bilateral talks. 
Pakistan’s demand to shelve construction work until 
the issue gets resolved was not heeded by India, as the 
latter did not want a repetition of the TNP, which 
has been shelved since 1987. Since no breakthrough 
was achieved, Pakistan sought arbitration of a neutral 
expert under the ambit of the IWT to look into the 
matter. The report by the neutral expert, Raymond 
Laffitte, vindicated the Indian position that the BhP 
was not in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. 
Design changes, including reductions in freeboard 
and pondage and increase in the height of the power 
intakes, were recommended. The neutral expert over-
ruled Pakistan’s objections over the use of gated spill-
ways, as it is one of the most important techniques to 
handle the problem of sedimentation. The verdict on 
the BhP case will hopefully establish momentum for 
building such projects in the conflict-ridden state, to 
augment developmental work there.
Tulbul • The Tulbul navigation project, called Wullar 
barrage in Pakistan, is part of the composite dialogue 
within the framework of the peace process under-
way between India and Pakistan (unlike the BhP, 
which was referred for international arbitration). 
The TNP originally envisaged the construction of a 
439-feet long and 40-feet wide barrage by India in 
1984 on the River Jhelum, at the mouth of Wullar 
Lake, near Sopore in Kashmir. With a maximum 
storage capacity of 0.30 million acre feet (MAF), it 
was intended to maximize the utilization of water at 
India’s largest fresh water lake, making the Jhelum 
navigable by regulating water storage in the Wullar 
through enhancing currents in the Jhelum during the 
lean months from November to February. Pakistan 
claims the TNP is in violation of the IWT, believing 
it could be used by India to control the river’s flow as 
a geo-strategic weapon. 
The Indian stance is that the purpose of the 
barrage is to make the river navigable in summer and 
not to affect the outflows into Pakistan. The barrage, 
according to Pakistan, would impede flows into their 
Upper Chenab Canal and the Lower Bari Doab 
Canals. The case was referred to the Indus Waters 
Commission in 1986, but failed to be resolved. 
Before Pakistan could move to the International 
Arbitral Court, India stopped construction and the 
project has been shelved ever since 1987. 
The most recent talks in August 2007 in the 
fourth round of composite dialogue ended incon-
clusively. In 1991, a draft agreement was prepared, 
which allowed the construction of the barrage with 
certain technical stipulations—such as leaving 6.2 
meters of barrage ungated, reducing general storage 
capacity by 30,000 acre feet—with due monitoring 
by the Indus Water Commissioners. however, the 
draft agreement was not signed, since Pakistan linked 
its resolution to the 390 MW Kishenganga hydro-
electric project, another unresolved issue between the 
countries, and demanded that India should forego its 
construction. The 1991 draft could be used as a basis 
for resolution as it asserted that the issue would be 
resolved within the scope of the IWT. Each conten-
tious issue has to be resolved separately for giving 
resolution a real chance. The tremendous potential of 
waterways in J&K needs to be utilized and reaching a 
consensus over such projects is imperative. 
Kishenganga • The Kishenganga Project entails a 75 
meter high concrete dam at Gurez at about 8,000 feet 
to store 140,000 MAF of water and divert some flows 
through a 22 km tunnel bored into the mountain 
into the Madmati Nala, which empties into the 
Wullar Lake. Kishenganga, called Neelum on the 
other side of the LoC, is a tributary that flows into 
the Jhelum near Nowshera (close to Muzaffarabad). 
Inter-tributary transfer is allowed under the IWT. 
Pakistan’s objection is that the water is not transferred 
into the same tributary Neelum, although it finally 
gets into the Jhelum. It also fears that the project 
would flush the Wullar Lake. India informed Pakistan 
about the project in 1994, while Pakistan contends 
that the construction of a dam on the Neelum near 
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Nowshera had been underway for irrigation pur-
poses and that 133,000 hectares was already being 
irrigated at that time. Pakistan’s Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) does not show 
this as one of its projects, and there is no evidence to 
substantiate this claim. According to India, the work 
on the Kishenganga Project commenced well before 
the Neelum project, while Pakistan insists to the 
contrary. Determination of the “existing use” of water 
that will get affected and the date that is to be taken 
into account for the same are the major issues of the 
dispute, among others. 
Areas for Cooperation: Revising 
the Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus is the lifeline of Pakistan and water sharing 
is therefore a very emotive issue in Pakistan as well 
as in Kashmir. The Kashmiris, however, feel that the 
IWT is unfair to them, as India relinquished con-
sumptive rights over the west flowing rivers, which 
pass through the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K). To meet the energy requirements of the state, 
harnessing these rivers is essential. The benefits that 
would have accrued to the state were surrendered 
by the Indian government without due consultation 
with the local government. Several power projects 
in the state have been held up due to disputes with 
Pakistan over the IWT. having a hydroelectric power 
potential of over 20,000 MW, J&K is in need of 
the critical infrastructure to harness its abundant 
resources. So far, hardly 1,500 MW of this potential 
has been exploited, both under state and Indian 
Central Government schemes. Against its require-
ment of over 1,600 MW, the state generates only 
about 450 MW. The state has an annual expenditure 
of Rs 2000 crore (approximately $500 million) on 
purchasing power from outside to meet its demands. 
The ongoing peace process in Kashmir needs to be 
complemented by an augmented pace of develop-
ment. Addressing the current power situation holds 
the key to the development question in the region 
and would provide enormous employment oppor-
tunities. Speedy resolution of the pending disputes 
is vital and the IWT, which has been honored even 
during wartime, needs to be the basis for resolution. 
Article VII of the IWT envisages future coop-
eration, pointing to the “common interest in the 
optimum development of the rivers” and calling 
upon both sides “to cooperate, by mutual consent, 
to the fullest extent in undertaking engineering 
works in the rivers.” Both India and Pakistan are also 
poor managers of water and have an inter-provincial 
problem of water sharing. Joint mechanisms under 
the IWT for harnessing and management of water 
should be part of the portfolio of confidence building 
measures between the two countries. The IWT-2 
that is discussed in some policy circles would be a 
take off from the IWT, which is instructive on the 
purposes of cooperation and dispute resolution and 
also provides ample scope for revision. With climate 
change threatening to impact rainfall patterns and 
water supply, both India and Pakistan need to think 
seriously of such a joint mechanism. Achieving the 
goals of more storage structures and better distribu-
tion channels requires joint deliberation. Laffitte 
stressed the use of modern technology in the BhP 
report, and cooperation on such technology for better 
water management would be extremely pertinent. 
It would significantly help in integrating the region 
economically. Political determination on both sides is 
absolutely necessary to make resolution and initia-
tion of such joint management of the Indus basin 
possible. Politicizing this emotive issue of water, 
as has occurred in the past, cannot be allowed to 
overshadow the process of such emerging coopera-
tion. Solutions to water sharing issues are vital for the 
development of Jammu and Kashmir, and coopera-
tion would represent a significant confidence building 
measure that would favorably impact the livelihoods 
of millions of people on both sides of the LoC.
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